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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON
Todd S. Aagaard*
It is time to rethink the domination of environmental law by a canon of
major federal environmental statutes enacted in the 1970s. Environmental
law is in a malaise. Despite widespread agreement that existing laws are
inadequate to address current environmental problems, Congress has not
passed a major environmental statute in more than twenty years. If it is to
succeed, the environmental law of this new century may need to evolve
into something that looks quite different than the extant environmental law
canon. The next generation of environmental laws must be viable for
creation and implementation even in an antagonistic political climate;
amenable to integration with other, non-environmental law; and able to
make inroads against the monumental peril of global climate change.
Environmental laws embedded in larger non-environmental programs and
dispersed throughout government offer an alternative model to the
environmental law canon—an alternative model that seems well suited to
help environmental law address these daunting challenges.
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Environmental law has a clear canon of statutes that attract the
bulk of attention in environmental law cases, courses, and treatises. The
canon consists of four major anti-pollution statutes administered by the
Environmental Protection Agency—the Clean Air Act 1; Clean Water
2
Act ; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) 3; and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) 4—along with two other statutes, the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) 5 and Endangered Species Act (ESA). 6 Congress
enacted the statutes comprising the canon in the 1970s, during what has
At the time,
been called the Environmental Law Revolution. 7
environmental protection was a bipartisan issue, and the major
environmental statutes were enacted with “sweeping majorities” and
“lopsided votes.” 8 The new statutes were highly ambitious in their aims,
consistent with the idea that a revolution was indeed at hand. 9
1

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
4
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k.
5
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h.
6
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599.
7
See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention:
The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717 (1999); Robert L.
Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the
Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 720 (2008); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law:
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical
Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1459 (1996); see also Robert V.
Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 159, 165 n.30 (1997) (“[T]here can be no doubt about the revolutionary nature
of the legislation.”).
8
See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of "Republican Moment" in Environmental
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1002, 1003 n.17 (2003); see also Richard N.L. Andrews,
The EPA at 40: An Historical Perspective, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 223, 224
(2011) (noting that in the early 1970s “solidly bipartisan majorities [in Congress] vested
this new agency [EPA] with sweeping new powers”); Percival, supra note 7, at 165
(1997) (noting that the major environmental statutes of the 1970s were enacted with
“overwhelming, bipartisan support”).
9
See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (declaring that “it is the
national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by
1985”); Clean Air Act § 109(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (directing EPA to publish
proposed regulations prescribing air quality standards within thirty days of the statute’s
enactment); see generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
67-73 (2004).
2
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In the decades since the Environmental Law Revolution, however,
the optimism that imbued the canonical environmental statutes has faded.
Environmental law suffers from a “mid-life crisis,” 10 or at least a
“malaise.” 11 Environmental lawmaking in Congress has stagnated.
Despite widespread agreement that inadequacies exist in the canonical
environmental law statutes, Congress has not passed a major
environmental statute since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Both
parties have failed in attempts to pass their key environmental legislative
initiatives, 12 and bipartisan legislative efforts on environmental issues
have been virtually unheard of. As the Breaking the Logjam Project has
noted, “For almost 20 years, political polarization and a lack of leadership
have left environmental protection in the United States burdened with
obsolescent statutes and regulatory strategies.” 13 The political climate has
become even more acrimonious of late, as EPA has become a lightning
rod for opponents of government regulation. 14
Meanwhile, although the canonical environmental statutes have
resulted in some dramatic reductions in pollution, 15 environmental threats
loom large. Many environmental harms continue relatively unregulated. 16
10

See, e.g., Linda A. Malone, Looking Beyond Environmental Law's Mid-Life Crisis, 23
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 680 (2006).
11
Holly Doremus, Reinvigorating the Union of Wonder and Power, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
281, 282 (2005).
12
See,
e.g.,
EPA,
Clear
Skies:
Legislative
Information,
http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/legis.html (noting that the Bush Administration’s Clear
Skies bill “never moved out of the Senate Environment and Public Works committee in
2005 and was therefore never enacted”); Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 11, 2010 (detailing the demise of the Obama Administration’s climate change bill in
the Senate).
13
Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., The Breaking the Logjam Project, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 1 (2008); see also Laurie Ristino & Sam Kalen, Is Environmental Law Serving
Society, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT., Spr. 2012, at 52, 53 (“Little doubt exists that our
middle-aged environmental programs are shouldering challenges not particularly wellsuited to their statutory frameworks.”); William Ruckelshaus, A New Shade of Green,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010 (commenting that “the solutions we devised back in the 1970s
aren’t likely to make much of a dent in the environmental problems we face today,” even
though “[c]onsiderable progress has been made thanks to those early laws”).
14
See, e.g., Robin Bravender & Gabriel Nelson, Republicans Blitz Obama Over EPA's
'Anti-Industrial' Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010; John M. Broder, Bashing
E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011; John M. Broder,
House Votes to Bar E.P.A. From Regulating Industrial Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2011.
15
See, e.g., EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970-1990, at ES-2
to ES3 (1997) (reporting that the Clean Air Act reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by 40%,
nitrogen oxides emissions by 30%, volatile organic compound emissions by 45%, carbon
monoxide emissions by 50%, primary particulate emissions by 75%, and lead emissions
by 99% as compared with what they otherwise would have been in 1990 without the
Act).
16
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 265 (2000) (noting that, despite their environmental impacts, “farms
are virtually unregulated by the expansive body of environmental law that has developed
in the United States in the past 30 years”).
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New regulatory challenges arise as advancements in science identify new
hazards. 17 The threat from anthropogenic global climate change, the worst
environmental problem in human history, continues to grow even as
efforts to enact comprehensive climate policy seem more and more
beyond reach. 18
Environmental law’s malaise in the face of challenges that would
be daunting even in the best of circumstances suggests that it is an
opportune time to investigate alternative models for environmental
lawmaking. To do so, however, requires rethinking the environmental law
canon’s predominance within the field of environmental law.
Environmental law scholarship, practice, and teaching tend to focus on the
environmental law canon, to the neglect of other environmental laws. 19
This inattention to environmental laws outside the canon is
understandable, because such laws do not compare to the environmental
law canon in terms of size or prominence.
But noncanonical
environmental laws are nevertheless an important category of
environmental law that deserves more attention for at least three related
reasons.
First, noncanonical environmental law has distinctive
characteristics that cohere it as a category and differentiate it from
canonical environmental law. Second, noncanonical environmental law
provides an alternative model for environmental lawmaking that may offer
significant advantages over relying wholly on the environmental law
canon to address the challenges currently facing environmental law.
Third, noncanonical environmental law, because it is atypical of
environmental law, offers unique vantage points from which to gain
insights into the field of environmental law as a whole. The paper
proceeds in three parts, affiliated with these three points.
Part I describes the topography of environmental law as a whole.
Mapping the field expands the recognized domain of environmental law
beyond the canon.
It also helps to identify both common and
distinguishing characteristics of environmental law.
Although
environmental laws share some defining characteristics, other key features
distinguish among environmental laws. These distinguishing features
explain functional differences among environmental laws and define
useful categories of environmental law. In particular, environmental laws
outside the canon exhibit functional characteristics that differ markedly

17

See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Nanotechnology and the Environment: What's
Next?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2012, at 51-52 (noting that nanotechnology is
an “emerging industrial hazard[] requiring safety research and regulation” and the
inadequacy of “existing applicable statutes . . . enacted at a time when the unique
challenges of nanotechnology were not yet contemplated”).
18
See infra Part II.E.3.
19
Cf. Austin B. Caswell, Canonicity in Academia: A Music Historian’s View, 25 J.
AESTHETIC EDUC. 129, 129 (1991) (asserting that “the tyranny of canonicity” can be
“destructive of our critical faculties”).
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from canonical environmental law, creating possible alternatives to
environmental law in its canonical form. 20
Part II focuses on a particular subspecies of noncanonical
environmental law that I call embedded environmental laws. Embedded
environmental laws are environmental statutes or statutory provisions
embedded within larger programs that are not primarily environmental,
and that are usually administered by agencies not primarily engaged in
environmental lawmaking—for example, the federal excise tax on ozonedepleting chemicals administered by the Internal Revenue Service, 21 or
limitations on the importation of illegally harvested timber administered
by the Agricultural Plant and Health Inspection Service. 22 Embedded
environmental laws offer an alternative model for environmental
lawmaking that may help address some of the major challenges currently
facing environmental law, including legislative stagnation, integration of
environmental law with law from other fields, and policies to address
global climate change.
Part III explores conceptual insights that the study of noncanonical
environmental laws can generate. Including noncanonical environmental
laws in the study of environmental law reveals a field that is more diverse
in both content and history than conventional accounts of environmental
law that focus on the canon. Noncanonical environmental laws also can,
by virtue of their location at the periphery of environmental law, shed light
on some of the field’s existential issues, such as defining the boundaries of
what regulatory objectives qualify as environmental. Such questions have
practical as well as theoretical import—whether a law is classified as
environmental or some other category determines, for example, what
congressional committee and what agency are likely to control it. An
examination of noncanonical environmental laws reveals that the
boundaries of environmental law are blurry, and overlap significantly with

20

As Part I makes clear, environmental law includes laws at a variety of levels of
government, from international to local. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
While acknowledging this range, this paper’s examination of environmental law outside
the canon focuses primarily on noncanonical federal environmental law for three reasons.
First, federal environmental statutes outside of the environmental law canon are an
alternative readily available to the lawmaking institution (Congress) that creates the
environmental law canon, which is composed of federal statutes. Second, the possibility
of state environmental regulation, because of the federalism issues it raises, has not
suffered from the same degree of inattention that afflicts other environmental law outside
of the canon. Third and finally, focusing on federal environmental statutes outside of the
canon gives the paper a more manageable scope. That being said, state environmental
laws, addressing issues ranging from pollution to fish and game to land use to water
rights to renewable energy standards, exhibit a rich diversity of features and warrant
additional scholarly examination as a category of their own.
21
I.R.C. §§ 4681-4682; see also Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United
States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417 (2011).
22
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122 Stat.
1651, 2052-56 (2008).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON

6

other fields. The creation, study, and practice of environmental law
should better reflect and address this messy reality.
I.

Mapping Environmental Law

Environmental law encompasses far more law than the few federal
statutes that comprise the environmental law canon and that predominate
in the field. 23 The field of environmental law can be classified into several
categories based on gradations of prominence: the canon, a subcanon of
diminished prominence but still relatively familiar laws, and finally
noncanonical environmental laws, which are either primarily associated
with other fields or simply altogether obscure. Figure 1 represents these
categories of environmental law as a series of concentric circles, in order
of increasing prominence as one approaches the center of the circle.

23

For the purposes this paper, the field of environmental law is defined to encompass
laws that reflect a consideration of human impacts on the natural environment. See Todd
S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95
CORNELL L. Rev. 221, 263 (2010) (arguing in favor of this definition among several
alternatives). This definition is not limited to laws with the only or overriding purpose of
protecting the environment, because environmental laws reflect a balance of objectives,
including but not limited to environmental protection. This definition also excludes laws
that unintentionally affect the environment. Even accepting this definition, however,
laws are not necessarily susceptible to simple classification as environmental or not. For
example, the common law of nuisance is not aimed specifically at the environment, but it
has important applications to remedying environmental problems. See, e.g., N.J. Dept. of
Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 1983) (holding under common law
of nuisance that landowners are strictly liable for harm caused by toxic wastes stored on
their property that flow onto the property of others); see also infra Part III (examining
how environmental laws outside the canon help to define the scope of the field).
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Figure 1: Categories of Environmental Law

Non-canonical
Subcanonical

Canonical

Although all environmental laws share certain features in
common, 24 other features vary among different environmental laws.
These differentiating features affect how the laws function. Moreover, the
environmental law canon shares a strong commonality of features not
representative of the diversity of the field as a whole. Because of
differences in their characteristics, environmental laws outside of the
canon do not function the same as canonical environmental laws. These
functional differences establish noncanonical environmental laws as a
distinct category of environmental law, with the potential to provide an
alternative model for environmental lawmaking.

24

In previous articles, I have explored the features that environmental laws share in
common and that distinguish environmental law from other legal fields. See Todd S.
Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Baselines in Environmental
Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 1505 (2011) (hereinafter “Use Conflicts”); Aagaard, supra note 23.
These previous articles argued that environmental lawmaking is best understood as the
management of conflicts among uses of environmental resources. See Aagaard, Use
Conflicts, supra, at 1525-27; Aagaard, supra note 23, at 264-69, 275. Environmental
resources share certain characteristics: they are physical; they are publicly rather than
privately valued, owned, and controlled; and they serve as media for pervasively
interrelated ecological systems. See Aagaard, supra note 23, at 264-69. Environmental
problems arise when potential uses of environmental resources conflict. See Aagaard,
Use Conflicts, supra, at 1526; Aagaard, supra note 23, at 275. Moreover, the
characteristics of resources are such that conflicts, when they arise, tend to be intense,
complicated, and multidimensional. See Aagaard, Use Conflicts, supra, at 1527. Here, by
contrast to these earlier works examining commonalities among environmental laws, my
focus is on distinguishing among environmental laws.
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Differentiating Features

Apart from the features that environmental laws share in
common, 25 other characteristics distinguish among environmental laws.
These differentiating features include the role of environmental protection,
the specific subject matter, the endpoints, the type of environmental
media, the regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms, the targets, the
form, the implementing institution, the level of government, and the
breadth. Different categories of environmental law exhibit different
patterns of these characteristics. One of the central challenges for
environmental lawmaking is matching the specific attributes of an
environmental problem with the most appropriate mix of features for the
environmental law that responds to the problem.
Role of Environmental Protection. Although a general goal of
environmental protection is a feature common to all environmental laws,
environmental protection plays varying roles in environmental laws.
Some environmental laws are enacted primarily to protect human health
and the environment. 26 Some laws are enacted in part to protect the
environment, but not necessarily as its primary goal—mixed-motive
environmental law, this category might be called. 27 Closely related to the
role of environmental protection in an environmental law is the strength of
that protection and the degree of its departure from the status quo. Even
as among two statutes focused on environmental protection,
environmental protection has a different role in a statute that calls for
studying an environmental problem than in a statute that imposes stringent
regulatory measures to remedy the problem.
Subject Matter. Although they share a common focus on the
environment, environmental laws address different subject matters. The
most prominent distinction drawn is between pollution laws and natural
resource laws. 28 Indeed, because of strong differences between pollution
laws and natural resource laws, opinions differ as to whether natural
resources laws fall within the field of environmental law or instead

25

See supra note 24 (citing and summarizing my prior work examining features that
environmental laws share in common).
26
See, e.g., Noise Control Act § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4901(b) (“The Congress declares that it
is the policy of the United States to promote an environment for all Americans free from
noise that jeopardizes their health or welfare.”).
27
See, e.g., Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (“It is the policy
of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”). Many
other laws significantly but unintentionally affect the physical environment—positively,
adversely, or both. Such laws are not part of environmental law per se, although they
merit increased attention from environmental law scholars, teachers, and practitioners.
See infra Part II.E.2.
28
See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 7, at 662 (referring to pollution and natural resources as
“the two main lines of environmental law”).
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constitute a separate but related legal field. 29 Within pollution laws, one
can differentiate laws that govern pollution abatement from laws that
govern pollution remediation. 30 Other environmental laws, such as laws
that address environmental processes and information 31 and laws that
restrict the sale or use of substances, 32 are not easy to classify as pollution
or natural resource.
Differences in subject matter affect how
environmental laws function. For example, the conceptual paradigm for
pollution statutes is regulating externalities arising from the use of private
property, such as the Clean Air Act’s regulation of air pollutant
emissions. 33 The conceptual paradigm for natural resources statutes, on
the other hand, is regulating use of open access public resources, such as
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act’s land use planning
process. 34
Endpoints. Environmental law encompasses laws that regulate to
protect human health as impacted by the natural environment, 35 other
human uses of environmental resources, 36 and ecological health directly. 37
29

See, e.g., id. at 718 (noting the debate and expressing the author’s preference “to use
the term ‘environmental law’ broadly to describe the subject encompassing both pollution
control and resource management”).
30
See Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 487-88 (2010); see also Lincoln L. Davies, Energy Policy Today and
Tomorrow-Toward Sustainability?, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 76-77
(2009) (using slightly different terminology). Pollution abatement, such as the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act, “aim to reduce, or mitigate, pollution.” Pollution remediation
laws such as the Comprehensive Environmental Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) “seek to clean up existing
pollution, or to ensure its proper disposal.” Davies, Alternative Energy and the EnergyEnvironment Disconnect, supra, at 488.
31
See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h;
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050.
32
See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136 to 136y; Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697.
33
See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (directing EPA to issue standards of
performance for new stationary sources of air pollution).
34
Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 202(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (“The
Secretary shall, with public involvement and consistent with the terms and conditions of
this Act, develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide
by tracts or areas for the use of the public lands.”). Notwithstanding the distinction that
can be made between externalities and open-access resources, the two concepts are of
course related and often arise in combination. Pollution externalities, for example,
generally operate via the medium of an open access resource such as the ambient air or a
waterway. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245
(1968). And the congestion effects of overusing an open access resource are a form of
externality. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 351 (1967).
35
See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (directing EPA to publish
national primary ambient air quality standards “to protect the public health”).
36
See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 169A-169B, 42 U.S.C. § 7491-7492 (establishing program
to improve visibility in certain designated areas where “visibility is an important value”).
37
See, e.g., ESA § 2(b) (stating Congress’s policy under the ESA “to conserve
endangered species and threatened species”).
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Many environmental laws regulate to protect both human and ecological
health. 38 Pollution statutes generally have tended to focus more on human
health impacts than on ecological health, whereas natural resources
statutes have tended to focus more on ecological health than on human
health.
Media. Environmental resources are commonly classified into
media—usually water, air, and land. 39 Many environmental laws aim at
regulating specific environmental media—for example, the Clean Water
Act regulates water pollution, the Clean Air Act regulates air pollution,
and the Solid Waste Disposal Act regulates contamination of soil and
groundwater. Other laws, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act,
which regulates the safety of chemicals in commerce, are not mediaspecific. Differences in physical characteristics across media have
important implications for regulating to protect that type of resources from
pollution.40 Airsheds, for example, can be much more complicated to
manage than watersheds. 41
Mechanisms. Environmental laws employ a variety of regulatory
and non-regulatory mechanisms, including environmental quality-based
standards, emissions limits based on technology standards, tradeable
emissions permitting, pollution charges, liability, information reporting
38

See, e.g., TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (authorizing EPA to regulate substances
that “present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); Clean Water
Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (establishing “the national goal that wherever
attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the
water”); RCRA § 1003(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (stating an objective of “assuring
that hazardous waste management practices are conducted in a manner which protects
human health and the environment”); CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)
(authorizing the Attorney General to file an action in federal district court in the case of
“an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the
environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a
facility”).
39
See, e.g., Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrated Environmental Control: The Expanding
Matrix, 22 ENVTL. L. 77, 83 (1992); Nigel D. Key & Jonathan D. Kaplan, Multiple
Environmental Externalities and Manure Management Policy, 32 J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON.
115, 115 (2007); Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three
Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 662 (2002).
40
Cf. LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 71-72 (explaining that the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act were each “reflective of the distinct physical features of the [type of pollution]
it addressed”).
41
Rich Poirot et al., Air Trajectory Pollution Climatology for the Lake Champlain Basin,
in LAKE CHAMPLAIN IN TRANSITION: FROM RESEARCH TOWARD RESTORATION 25, 25-26
(T.O. Manley & P.L. Manley, eds., 1999) (noting that the Lake Champlain watershed is
“clearly defined by fixed geographical boundaries,” whereas “the spatial and temporal
variations of emission sources and meteorological conditions, make it virtually
impossible to develop a fixed definition of airshed”). Even where environmental laws
attempt to regulate specifically to particular media, environmental media cannot be fully
segregated. Contaminants in air pollution, for example, can pollute water or land through
atmospheric deposition. See Gary M. Lovett, Atmospheric Deposition of Nutrients and
Pollutants in North America: An Ecological Perspective, 4 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS
629 (1994).
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and disclosure requirements, use limitations, subsidies, and technical
assistance. 42 Many environmental statutes include a combination of
multiple mechanisms, and major environmental statutes may include
virtually all of them in some form. 43
Regulatory Targets. Some environmental laws regulate the private
sector directly, 44 and some regulate government action qua sovereign. 45
Many statutes involve a mix of governmental and private sector regulatory
targets. Most of the major environmental statutes regulate federal
facilities as well as privately owned and operated pollution sources. 46
Statutes that ultimately aim at regulating private sector conduct may
include detailed requirements for the government agencies that implement
them. 47 Statutes that regulate government action qua sovereign indirectly
regulate the private sector—for example, if NEPA requires the Army
Corps of Engineers to prepare an Environmental Assessment before
granting a permit allowing a private developer to fill a wetland, 48 then the
developer feels the regulatory effects of NEPA as much as, if not more
than, the Corps of Engineers does.
Form. Environmental laws take a variety of forms, including
treaties, 49 statutes, 50 administrative regulations, 51 court decisions, 52 and
common law doctrines. 53 Although environmental laws are generally
42

U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-ENV-634,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE 81-142 (1995).
43
See Andrews, supra note 8, at 231 (noting the different regulatory mechanisms
Congress enacted in the new federal environmental statutes of the 1970s)
44
Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (prohibiting, with certain specified
exceptions, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”).
45
See, e.g., NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (directing federal agencies to prepare
environmental impact statements for proposed major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the environment).
46
See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (providing that federal
facilities “shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control
and abatement of water pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity”); Clean Air Act § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (providing that
federal facilities “shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and
local requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity”).
47
See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(E) (requiring a state
seeking EPA approval of its state implementation plans to provide assurances that it “will
have adequate personnel, funding, and authority . . . to carry out such implementation
plan”).
48
See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1274 (10th Cir. 2004).
49
See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
50
See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
51
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
52
See, e.g., Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007); Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
53
See, e.g., Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 667 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2011)
(asserting claims under the federal common law of public nuisance against federal and
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easily classified by form, 54 the different forms are also highly interrelated.
Statutes may implement treaties. 55 Administrative regulations implement
statutes. 56 Courts’ interpretations of statutes become functionally part of
the statutes themselves. 57
Statutes may incorporate common law
doctrines. 58
Implementing Institution. Environmental laws are implemented by
different institutions. Some environmental laws, such as common law
environmental torts, are primarily implemented by private parties and
courts through litigation. Most environmental laws, however, are
implemented by an administrative agency of some form. Within this
category, there is substantial diversity. It matters to the functioning of a
law whether its implementation is controlled by, for example, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the purpose of which is to effect
environmental protection 59; a resource agency such as the Army Corps of
Engineers or Forest Service, which has more diverse goals and
traditionally has been oriented toward economic exploitation of natural
resources; or an agency such as the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, which has not traditionally focused on environmental
issues. 60
Level of Government. Environmental laws originate at all different
levels of government—for example, international, 61 national, state, 62 and
city agencies for allegedly managing the Chicago Area Waterway System in a manner
that will allow invasive carp to move into the Great Lakes, causing an ecological
disaster).
54
But see, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 643 F.3d 311, 320-21 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding that EPA guidance document was actually a legislative rule that required notice
and comment).
55
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671Q (implementing the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).
56
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1517.7 (implementing the National Environmental
Policy Act).
57
See, e.g., Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL
2381955, at *5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (interpreting the language of Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
58
See, e.g., In re Bell Petro. Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Congress intended courts to draw on “traditional and evolving common law principles” to
determine the scope of liability under CERCLA).
59
EPA, Our Mission and What We Do, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/whatwedo.html
(“The mission of EPA is to protect human health and the environment.”).
60
The extent to which an agency has an environmental mission and environmental
expertise can change significantly. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service exemplify agencies that over time have been
delegated more environmental responsibilities and have in turn responded by increasing
their environmental expertise.
61
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of
Environmental Problems in the Border Area, U.S.-Mexico, Aug. 14, 1983, 22 I.L.M.
1025.
62
Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (HSCA), 35 P.S. §§ 6020.101-.1305.
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local. 63 The level of government plays a very important role in defining
the context in which lawmaking and implementation occurs. Different
levels of government operate under very different overarching structures
and authorities. For example, state governments may be able to regulate
water pollution more broadly under their state constitutions than the
federal government’s restricted authority under the Commerce Clause of
the national Constitution. 64 On the other hand, national environmental
laws sometimes implement international treaties, 65 state environmental
statutes are often modeled on federal environmental statutes, 66 and federal
environmental statutes often employ cooperative federalism that allows
state environmental programs to implement federal statutes, 67 somewhat
undercutting the distinction between the different levels. 68
Breadth. Environmental laws vary in scope from narrowly
targeted 69 to extremely expansive. 70 The breadth of an environmental law
depends largely on its other characteristics, such as the subject matter and
level of government. Breadth affects, in turn, the magnitude of the costs
and benefits of a law and the resources needed to implement it.
B.

Categories of Prominence

Having identified features that differentiate among environmental
laws, we can move to the task of pinpointing those environmental laws
63

See, e.g., Noise Control Ordinance, Los Angeles, Cal. Code §§ 12.08.010-.680.
Compare 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (defining “waters of the United States” covered by the
Clean Water Act to include interstate waters and waters with a connection to interstate
commerce) with 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 691.1 (defining “Waters of the Commonwealth”
covered by the Clean Streams Law “to include any and all . . . bodies or channels of
conveyance of surface and underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural or
artificial, within or on the boundaries of this Commonwealth”).
65
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671Q (implementing the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).
66
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 6301-6309 (adopting hazardous waste management
provisions similar to RCRA).
67
See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (allowing EPA to authorize
state water pollution discharge permit programs implementing the federal Clean Water
Act).
68
Robert Fischman undertook a somewhat similar analysis in a 2008 article in which he
identified certain attributes that distinguish among environmental laws. See Fischman,
supra note 7. Fischman distinguished pollution control versus resource management
subject matters; categorical versus utilitarian regulatory approaches, statutory detail
versus agency latitude; Commerce Clause versus Property Clause constitutional
authority. Id. at 666-84. As opposed to mapping the field generally, Fischman focused
on how these features “distinguish the two main lines of environmental law [pollution
law and natural resources law] from each other.” Id. at 662.
69
See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 262m-4 (supporting “the strengthening of educational programs
within each multilateral development bank to improve the capacity of mid-level
managers to initiate and manage environmental aspects of development activities, and to
train officials of borrowing countries in the conduct of environmental analyses”).
70
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“Except as in compliance with this section and sections
1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by
any person shall be unlawful”).
64
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that comprise the environmental law canon and comparing them to other
environmental laws in terms of the differentiating features.
1.

Environmental Law Canon

This section defines the environmental law canon, identifies those
environmental laws that comprise the canon, and then assesses the canon
in terms of the differentiating features discussed in Part I.A, demonstrating
a strong commonality of certain characteristics across the canon that is not
shared by the field of environmental law as a whole.
Attempting to define which environmental laws comprise the
canon necessitates first defining what we mean by the canon. “What is
‘canonical’ in law varies according to how the canon is defined, and how
the canon is defined depends on the purpose of the canon.” 71 In general,
canon connotes a prominence and significance of certain items among a
broader set. Beyond this commonality, canon has several related but
different meanings in contemporary common usage. 72 This paper uses
canon in the sense of a collection of the most important items in a field.
Important laws are not necessarily good laws, and so canon as used
here is primarily descriptive rather than normative. 73 Although there may
be various ways of assessing the prominence and importance of laws to
their legal field, which could in some cases lead to uncertainty and
disagreement about which laws constitute a canon, the most obvious
measures of prominence in environmental law all point to a group of six
71

J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963, 975 (1998).
72
Cf. id., at 968 n.24 (tracing the etymology and historical usage of the term). Different
specific meanings involve different measures of significance or different types of items
being sorted. Canon can mean a collection of the most important items in a field. See
David Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon:
Schneiderman v. United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 90 n.10 (2002) (citing BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 198 (7th ed. 1999)); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57
STAN. L. REV. 825, 825 (2004). Canon can refer to a fundamental legal principle.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity,
Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000). A canon can be an important
theme or way of thinking about a field. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family
Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 825 (2004); Mark Tushnet, The Canon(s) of Constitutional
Law: An Introduction, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 187 (2000). Canon can mean “an authority
that can be invoked in the face of almost any counterevidence because it is its own
evidence and stronger in its force than any other”—that is, an authority that “stops
inquiry.” Stanley Fish, Not of an Age, but for All Time: Canons and Postmodernism, 43 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 11, 12 (1993). Finally, canon law refers to a body of law developed within
a particular religious tradition. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also,
e.g., George La Piana, Book Review, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 855 (1936) (reviewing AMLETO
GIOVANNI CICOGNANI, CANON LAW (1934)).
73
That being said, a highly beneficial law is hopefully more likely to thrive and take on
importance than a poorly functioning law, so there probably is some correlation between
the normative value of a law and whether it is prominent and therefore canonical. Cf.
infra note 282 (noting that even identifying certain characteristics as salient makes an
indirectly normative evaluation).
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federal environmental statutes that dominates the teaching and practice of
what is generally regarded as environmental law:
 Clean Air Act, 74 the primary federal air pollution statute;
75
 Clean Water Act, the primary federal water pollution statute;
 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 76 which authorizes the cleanup of
environmental contamination and imposes liability for such
cleanups;
 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 77 which
regulates the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and
disposal of hazardous waste;
 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 78 which requires
federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their
proposed actions; and
 Endangered Species Act (ESA), 79 which regulates activities that
harm threatened or endangered species.
As Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate, these six statutes are far more
likely than other environmental laws to be mentioned in cases, law review
articles, and casebooks:
Figure 2: Frequency of Mention in Cases by Statute 80

74

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.
76
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
77
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k.
78
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h.
79
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599.
80
Figure 2 indicates the number of state and federal cases decided since January 1, 2000,
that mention each statute. Searches were run in the Westlaw and Lexis Nexis databases
of all state and federal cases; the numbers reported are the average of the two databases.
“NFMA” refers to the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614.
“FLPMA” refers to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 17011787. “FIFRA” refers to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136 to 136y. “OPA” refers to the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762.
75

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON

16

Figure 3: Frequency of Mention in Law Review Articles by Statute 81

Figure 4: Frequency of Substantial Coverage in Casebooks by Statute 82

These data show that when lawyers, scholars, and teachers
practice, think, and teach about the field of environmental law, they do so
81

Figure 3 indicates the number of law review articles published since January 1, 2000,
that mention each statute. Searches were run in the Westlaw and Lexis Nexis databases
of all U.S. and Canadian law journals; the numbers reported are the average of the two
databases. “SDWA” refers to the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j26. “Kyoto” refers to the Kyoto Protocol. “GATT” refers to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.
82
Figure 4 indicates the frequency with which federal environmental statutes are
substantially covered in eleven leading environmental law casebooks. See ROBIN
KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT (3d ed. 2012); HOLLY DOREMUS ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS (6th ed. 2012);
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (8th ed.
2010); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
(4th ed. 2003); CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
(3d ed. 2010); LINDA A. MALONE & WILLIAM M. TABB, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY,
AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2011); PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1994); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY (6th ed. 2009); ZYGMUNT
J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY (4th ed.
2010); RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2012).
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primarily with reference to a relatively small set of common materials.
Unlike other legal fields in which there may be a divergence among what
materials are taught in law school courses, the materials requisite for
knowledgeable participation in civic debate, and the materials important to
legal academics, 83 in the field of environmental law a common set of
materials predominates in all three of these forums. These statutes
comprise the environmental law canon.
Comparing the six statutes in the environmental law canon to the
various characteristics that differentiate among environmental laws, 84 the
environmental law canon generally shares five characteristics in
common—the role of environmental protection, the subject matter, the
form of law, the level of government, and the institution charged with
implementation:
 Laws in the environmental law canon are enacted primarily for the
purpose of protecting the environment.
 Canonical environmental laws generally—but not universally—
address pollution.
 Canonical environmental laws are statutes, including the progeny
of statutes such as administrative regulations implementing a
statute or cases interpreting a statute or regulation.
 Laws in the environmental law canon are national laws.
 EPA administers most laws in the environmental law canon.
In addition to sharing these functional attributes, the environmental
law canon also shares a common historical pedigree. The statutes that
comprise the environmental law canon are the product of the
“Environmental Revolution” 85 of the 1970s, which encompassed the first
Earth Day, 86 enactment of most of the major federal environmental
statutes, 87 and the creation of the EPA. 88 That being said, only some of
83

Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson refer to these respectively as the “pedagogical
canon,” “cultural literacy canon,” and the “academic theory canon.” J.M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998).
84
See supra Part I.A.
85
See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 396 (1995); Denis Hayes, Environmental Law and Millennial Politics,
25 ENVTL. L. 953, 964 (1995); Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1321, 1328 (1997); see also Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in
the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707,
717 (1999) (referring to the “environmental law revolution”); Fischman, supra note 7, at
720 (same); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the
Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 1407, 1459 (1996) (same).
86
See Anderson, supra note 85, at 395 (describing events during the first Earth Day on
April 22, 1970).
87
See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852; Clean
Water Act, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1676 (1970); Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973); see
also LAZARUS, supra note 9, at at 70 (listing eighteen major federal environmental
protection statutes enacted during the 1970s).
88
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970).
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the federal environmental statutes Congress enacted during the 1970s are
canonical; others receive relatively meager attention in cases, casebooks,
and law review articles. 89
The environmental law canon, as the concept is employed here, is
defined and functions largely descriptively. But the canon has normative
elements as well. Within the environmental community it is largely
revered, even when criticized. 90
Calls for political action on
environmental issues often explicitly invoke the 1970s as a model and
inspiration, 91 recognizing both the dramatic material accomplishments of
the enactments of that period and their strong idealism which resonates
with many environmentalists. William Eskridge and John Ferejohn have
classified the statutes of the environmental law canon as examples of
“superstatutes,” 92 which share three features:
89

See, e.g., Noise Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918). As compared with thousands of citations in cases and law
reviews to the canonical environmental statutes, see supra Figures 2-3, just 38 cases and
92 law review articles since 2000 have mentioned the Noise Control Act.
Some environmental histories have criticized, to greater and lesser extents, the
narrative of the Environmental Revolution—that is, the idea that the early 1970s
represented the spontaneous “divine conception” of a new field of law. See, e.g., KARL
BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, 1945-1970, at 14 (2009). These histories have described the 1970s as a phase in
the continued development of a body of law that long preceded the developments in the
1970s. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra, at 14. Richard Lazarus has offered a more middleground perspective, emphasizing both the dramatic changes in the early 1970s and the
historical antecedents to those changes. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 49 (“The
environmental statutes and institutions that emerged in the 1970s were of a very different
magnitude than any previously existing regimes for environmental protection, but they
reflected a logical, albeit exponential, outgrowth of decades of legal evolution on closely
related matters.”). Regardless, all of these histories readily acknowledge the significance
of the 1970s to the construction of our current system of federal environmental statutes.
See, e.g., BROOKS, supra, at 15 (noting that “[t]he rate of environmental lawmaking
attained its zenith in the early 1970s”); Davies, Alternative Energy and the EnergyEnvironment Disconnect, supra note 30, at 486 (“No matter how environmental law’s
historical taxonomy is built, it is plain that the 1970s were ground-shifting.”); LAZARUS,
supra note 9, at 69 (characterizing the 1970s as “a statutory and institutional
transformation” during which “[s]eemingly every aspect of environmental protection and
natural resource conservation was the subject of comprehensive congressional
legislation”).
90
See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 253 (opining that, despite “slippage,” “regulatory
perversities,” and “serious and persistent socioeconomic and racial inequities,”
“environmental law has been remarkably successful”).
91
See, e.g., David K. Hausman, Sen. Kerry Urges Eco-Awareness in Speech, HARVARD
CRIMSON, Apr. 23, 2007 (reporting speech in which Senator John Kerry “urged a return
to the environmental activism of the early 1970s”).
92
WILLIAM N ESKRIDGE, JR., & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 256, 301
(2010) (offering the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act as
examples of “superstatutes” that comprise a “green constitution”); William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1242-46 (2001) (discussing the
Endangered Species Act as a “superstatute” case study); see also Jim Chen, Legal
Mythmaking in A Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories of Origins with Human
Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 292 (2005) (“The National Environmental Policy
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[S]uperstatutes . . . (1) embod[y] a new principle or policy
displacing common law baselines, responsive to important
social or economic challenges facing the country; (2) [are]
drafted and enacted after a process of institutionalized
deliberation responsive to the needs of We the People; and
(3) [are] stuck in the public culture, after a period of
implementation and formal confirmation by Congress after
public discussion.” 93
Superstatutes, although “subordinate to the Constitution,” become part of
“the fundamental structure and values of American public policy,”
“instatiat[ing] both social norms and legal rules.” 94 Thus, according to
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account of superstatutes, the environmental law
canon becomes the focal point not only of environmental law, but of
environmental norms more generally.
This points to a more subtle, and potentially pernicious, normative
effect of the environmental law canon. The predominance of the
environmental law canon in the field, and the strongly similar features the
canon exhibits, project an image of environmental law that is more
homogenous and narrow than the field as a whole. This, in turn, obscures
the existence of environmental laws outside of the canon, and more
importantly obscures the possibility of enacting environmental laws that
do not resemble the canon. 95
2.

Special Cases: ESA and NEPA

Two canonical environmental statutes, the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 97 present special
96

Act of 1970 (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”) head the list of
environmental “ ‘super-statutes’ ” whose “ ‘institutional [and] normative” impact reaches
issues ordinarily addressed through Constitutional law.’ ”) (internal footnotes omitted)
(quoting Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra, at 1216).
93
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 92, at 26.
94
Id. at 27, 27, 28.
95
An exception to this is the federalism debate over the optimal balance between national
and state environmental regulation, which has received ample attention. See, e.g.,
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U.
ENV'TL L.J. 130, 151 (2005); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and
the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority,
14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental StandardSetting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997);
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996);
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-theBottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210
(1992); Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An
Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State
Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 55 (1998); Peter P.
Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67
(1996).
96
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599.
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cases. By any measure of prominence, the ESA and NEPA qualify as
canonical. Commentators often describe the ESA and NEPA as among
the most important environmental laws. 98 Both the ESA and NEPA are
among the most litigated environmental statutes, the most cited in law
review articles, and appear in the leading environmental law casebooks. 99
Both focus overwhelmingly on environmental protection. 100 Both were
enacted in the 1970s. 101
But the ESA and NEPA do not entirely follow the dominant
pattern for the environmental law canon, and have some characteristics
more associated with environmental laws outside the canon. Both statutes
are often classified as resource statutes, 102 and receive extensive coverage

97

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h.
The ESA has been called “one of the most potent environmental laws,” J.B. Ruhl &
James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 59 (2010); and
“one of America's best-known and most important environmental laws,” Reed D.
Benson, Dams, Duties, and Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation Water Project Operations
and the Endangered Species Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (2008). NEPA is often
called the “Magna Carta” of environmental law. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Judging
Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 209 (2004); Daniel R. Mandelker, The
National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its Experience and Problems, 32 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010).
99
See infra Part I.B (reporting the frequency that specific environmental statutes appear
in cases, law review articles, and environmental law casebooks).
100
ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve
the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.”);
NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation;
and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.”).
101
Congress enacted NEPA in 1970, see Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (1970), and the
ESA in 1973, see Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (1973).
102
See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 7, at 669, 682 (referring to NEPA and the ESA,
respectively, as resource statutes); Alyson C. Flournoy et. al., Harnessing the Power of
Information to Protect Our Public Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1575,
1591-92 (2008) (referring to NEPA as a resource statute); Alyson C. Flournoy,
Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
105, 132 (1996 (referring to the ESA as a resource statute); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats,
Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403,
464 (1994) (referring to NEPA as a resource statute). Although NEPA and the ESA are
often classified as resource statutes, they have distinctive features—e.g., primary focus
on environmental protection, broad application across the federal government—that
differentiate them from the other resource statutes and explain their prominence and
inclusion in the canon.
98
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in natural resources law casebooks. 103 Neither statute focuses on
pollution, and neither is primarily administered by EPA. The ESA is
primarily administered by resource agencies—the Fish and Wildlife
Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Fisheries
Service 104—but also places significant implementation responsibilities on
all federal agencies. 105 NEPA’s obligations attach to “all agencies of the
Federal Government.” 106
Moreover, the nature of NEPA’s and the ESA’s requirements are
such that implementation of those statutes becomes integrated with other,
non-environmental law. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare and to
release to the public an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before
taking any major action “significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” 107 This obligation attaches to agency programs as diverse
as the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s funding of a
housing development revitalization project, 108 the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s designation of a national interest electric
transmission corridor, 109 and the Army Corps of Engineers’ construction
of a dam. 110 The Endangered Species Act prohibits the “take” of any
endangered species 111 and further requires all federal agencies, in
consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service or the Fisheries Service,
“insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
. . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of [critical] habitat of such species.” 112 These requirements,
like NEPA, also apply to diverse circumstances, such as the Federal
103

See, e.g., CHRISTINE KLEIN, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF
PROBLEMS AND CASES 123-84, 759-823 (2005); JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 258-92, 348-440 (2d ed. 2009).
104
See, e.g., ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (delegating authority to list species as
endangered or threatened to the Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Commerce).
105
See, e.g., ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring “[e]ach Federal agency” to
insure that its actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species”).
106
42 U.S.C. § 4332.
107
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). Not every federal action necessitates a full EIS. To
determine whether the environmental impacts of a proposed action will be significant
enough to warrant a full EIS, the agency may prepare an Environmental Assessment. See
40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b)-(c), 1508.9 (2011). If, based on the Environmental Assessment,
the agency concludes that the proposed action will not significantly impact the
environment, it will issue a Finding of No Significant Impact in lieu of an EIS. See 40
C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2011). See generally Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752,
756–58 (2004) (providing an overview of EISs, Environmental Assessments, and
Findings of No Significant Impact).
108
Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 237–38 (5th Cir. 2006)
109
California Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1096-98 (9th Cir.
2011).
110
See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 364-67 (1989)
111
Endangered Species Act § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)(B).
112
Endangered Species Act § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) provision of federal flood
insurance, 113 the Army’s ongoing operation of a military base, 114 and the
Department of Energy's grant of an easement across its property for
construction and use of a private mining road. 115
Because NEPA and the ESA are for the most part implemented by
agencies that do not specialize in environmental law, and because NEPA
and the ESA’s requirements apply to activities not necessarily undertaken
as part of environmental programs, both statutes are essentially
incorporated into non-environmental programs.
For example, the
application of the ESA’s “take” and “jeopardy” provisions to FEMA’s
National Flood Insurance Program essentially incorporates the ESA
provisions into the federal flood insurance program. The integration of
NEPA and ESA implementation with non-environmental programs
distinguishes NEPA and the ESA from other statutes in the environmental
canon, which are administered by EPA as part of its set of environmental
statutes. In fact, the integration of NEPA and ESA implementation with
non-environmental programs resembles a key feature of some noncanonical environmental statutes—a category I call “embedded
environmental laws”—which Part II examines in detail.
As statutes that receive widespread attention from practitioners and
academics, but which have some distinctive features more associated with
environmental laws outside of the canon than within it, the ESA and
NEPA somewhat muddy the distinction between canonical and
noncanonical environmental law. But the ESA’s and NEPA’s unusual,
noncanonical features also make them potentially useful vehicles for
understanding how the distinctive features of noncanonical environmental
law affect how it functions as law. 116 Moreover, the noncanonical
characteristics of NEPA and the ESA enable both statutes to work
synergistically in support of noncanonical environmental provisions. 117
3.

Subcanonical Environmental Law

Outside of the core environmental law canon lie other sets of
environmental laws that have some, but not all, of the features of
canonical environmental law and a correspondingly diminished
prominence in the field—well below the importance of the statutes in the
canon, but still more important than other categories of noncanonical
environmental law. Some of these subcanonical environmental laws have
important links with canonical environmental laws.

113

See Florida Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1141-44 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the ESA § 7 applies to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s administration
of the National Flood Insurance Program).
114
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (D. Ariz. 2002).
115
Sierra Club v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Colo. 2002).
116
See infra Part II.
117
See infra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
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Resource Statutes. Outside of the canon of federal statutes enacted
primarily to protect the natural environment, the set of laws most closely
associated with environmental law are the federal natural resource statutes.
They receive significant attention in case law, in law school curricula, and
in legal scholarship—although to a lesser extent than the pollution statutes
and with a disproportionate emphasis in the West. 118 Resource statutes
share several characteristics that distinguish them from statutes in the
environmental law canon.
Resource statutes are mixed-motive
environmental laws that, although they include a goal of conserving and
preserving elements of the natural environment, 119 also intentionally
facilitate the exploitation of natural resources. 120 Their subject matter is
natural resources rather than pollution, and they are administered by
resource agencies rather than by EPA. 121 Resource agencies are staffed
and operate very differently than EPA, and even operate under different
constitutional authority. 122
Other Federal Pollution Statutes. Not all federal pollution statutes
fall within the environmental law canon. EPA administers other statutes
lacking the prominence of the major pollution statutes that comprise the
environmental law canon. Some of these EPA statutes, such as the Safe
118

In fact, the importance of publicly owned natural resources in rural areas of the West
may give the resource statutes more prominence than the canonical pollution statutes in
such areas.
119
See, e.g., Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) § 202(c)(3), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1712(c)(3) (instructing the Secretary of the Interior, in the management of public lands
administered by the Bureau of Land Management, to “give priority to the designation and
protection of areas of critical environmental concern”). Clean Water Act § 404, 33
U.S.C. § 1344, which regulates the placement of dredge and fill material in waters of the
United States, presents an interesting question of classification. Although the Clean
Water Act overall is a canonical pollution statute, the dredge-and-fill program under
§ 404 is often viewed instead as a wetlands protection provision more associated with
natural resources law. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. GABA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 88 (4th ed.
2009) (observing that § 404 “is typically not addressed in detail in environmental law
casebooks”); Oliver A. Houck, Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast South and How It Might Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1059,
1070 (2007) (“Originally seen as a pollution control program, section 404 quickly
became a wetlands-development control program as well . . . .”).
120
See, e.g., FLPMA § 202(c)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) (instructing the Secretary of the
Interior, in the management of the same public lands, to “observe the principles of
multiple use and sustained yield,” which are defined to include the potential extraction of
timber and minerals); see also LAZARUS, supra note 9, at 178 (“Natural resources laws
historically equated the public interest with the economic exploitation and development
of natural resources, although resource conservation and ‘public trust doctrine’ principles
had emerged as a significant counterweight by the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century.”).
121
See, e.g., National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614
(administered by the Forest Service); National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1
to 18f-3 (administered by the National Park Service); Federal Lands Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787 (administered by the Bureau of
Land Management).
122
EPA statutes operate largely under the authority of the Commerce Clause; natural
resource statutes operate largely under the authority of the Property Clause.
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Drinking Water Act, 123 have the requisite features of the statutes in the
canon but are much smaller programs by virtue of their narrower scope.
Others aim at somewhat different objectives. The Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) 124 and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 125 for example, address human health and
environmental hazards throughout the life cycle of a substance rather than
just when a substance is released into the environment. The Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA or EPCRTKA)126
addresses emergency planning and reporting of inventories and releases of
hazardous chemicals.
State Law Analogues. Although the environmental law canon is
decidedly federal—for example, no major environmental law casebook
examines state environmental laws in detail—some state environmental
statutes are functionally close to the canon. State environmental statutes
are often modeled on federal environmental statutes. 127 Many times this
modeling arises because federal environmental statutes, through what is
known as cooperative federalism or “delegated program federalism,”128
allow state environmental programs to implement federal statutes. 129 To
some extent, this relationship emphasizes and inflates the primacy of
federal environmental law, because state environmental laws developed
under cooperative federalism usually closely resemble the federal
environmental laws they implement. But the role of states in cooperative
federalism regimes also gives states a degree of power in setting federal
policy, because EPA sometimes lacks the capacity to supersede state
programs and accordingly must defer to state programs even when they
diverge from the supposedly minimum federal standard. 130 Even state
statutes modeled on federal statutes may give states increased authority
that federal agencies lack under their statutes. Washington’s cleanup
statute, for example, includes petroleum and petroleum products that
123

42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697.
125
7 U.S.C. §§136-136y.
126
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050
127
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 6301-6309 (adopting hazardous waste management
provisions similar to RCRA); 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-13.7 (adopting water pollution
provisions similar to the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act).
128
See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1565 (2007) (noting that federal
environmental statutes often allow state governments to assume implementation and
enforcement of a program if state laws are at least as stringent federal requirements);
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1276 (2009) (“Since the 1970s, states have implemented and enforced most of the
United States's major environmental statutes.”).
129
See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (allowing EPA to authorize
state water pollution discharge permit programs implementing the federal Clean Water
Act).
130
See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 128, at 1276-77 (citing John P. Dwyer, The
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995)).
124
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CERCLA specifically excludes. 131 Pennsylvania’s Clean Streams Law
similarly covers more water bodies than the federal Clean Water Act. 132
Common Law. The common law also occupies a special place in
environmental law, in some ways like certain state environmental laws—
outside the canon but also closely intertwined with it. Common law
doctrines that address environmental problems share few features in
common with canonical environmental laws. Common law has a
primarily remedial purpose, whereas environmental regulation has a
regulatory purpose. 133 Common law doctrines employ different regulatory
mechanisms than statutes; common law imposes liability for the harm
conduct causes, statutes generally prohibit certain conduct, without a
showing of individualized harm. Common law doctrines are judge-made
and administered by courts through largely private litigation; statutes are
enacted by legislatures and administered by administrative agencies.
Common law doctrines are primarily state, rather than federal law. The
differences between environmental statutes and common law are in part
quite deliberate. Modern environmental statutes were enacted in part
because of the perceived inadequacy of common law doctrines to protect
the environment. 134 But common law doctrines are also not entirely
separate from environmental statutes—for example, courts often construe
undefined statutory terms according to their meaning in the common
law, 135 and statutory requirements may help to define common law
liability. 136
International Environmental Treaties. International environmental
treaties lie at the intersection of the fields of environmental law and
international law and form the foundation of international environmental
law, a subfield of both fields. Some treaties have generated implementing
legislation that shows up in the environmental law canon, such as the
provisions of the Clean Air Act that implement the Montreal Protocol. 137
131

Compare CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (stating that hazardous substance
“does not include petroleum”) with Wash. Rev. Code § 70.105D.020(10)(D) (defining
hazardous substance to include “Petroleum or petroleum products”).
132
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (tying the definition of “waters of the United States”
covered by the Clean Water Act to the waters’ effect on foreign and interstate commerce)
with 5 Pa. Stat. § 691.1 (defining “Waters of the Commonwealth” covered by the Clean
Streams Law “to include any and all . . . bodies or channels of conveyance of surface and
underground water, or parts thereof, whether natural or artificial, within or on the
boundaries of this Commonwealth”).
133
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 82, at 74.
134
See Percival, supra note 7, at 159 (noting that the major environmental statutes
enacted in the 1970s were in part “adopted in response to perceived inadequacies of the
common law”).
135
See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 277 F.3d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing the
Lacey Act by inquiring “whether Congress used terms which have a specific commonlaw meaning”).
136
See, e.g., Gearhardt v. Am. Reinforced Paper Co., 244 F.2d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 1957)
(affirming judgment for plaintiff where defendant negligently caused a fire that damaged
plaintiff’s property in violation of Illinois state law).
137
See Clean Air Act §§ 601-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q.
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Noncanonical Environmental Law

Outside of the categories of canonical and subcanonical
environmental laws, there are other environmental laws that lie clearly
apart from the canon of the field, both in terms of their relative obscurity
within environmental law and differences in their characteristic features.
Some of these categories of noncanonical environmental law
exhibit multiple features that separate them from the environmental law
canon. For example, state natural resources statutes, 138 which tend to
receive meager attention, are natural resource statutes rather than pollution
statutes and state rather than federal laws. Noncanonical environmental
law also includes private law that addresses environmental concerns, such
as a lease term that seeks to prevent the lessee from causing environmental
contamination on the lessor’s property. 139
Other categories of noncanonical environmental law, such as local
land use law, are recognized independent legal fields. These related fields
overlap incompletely with environmental law, in that some but not all of
the laws within the field address environmental concerns. Such related
fields have their own independent casebooks, scholarship, and doctrine.140
Energy law provides an interesting example of a related field that may
once have fit within the category of noncanonical environmental law, or
perhaps not environmental law at all, but has arguably ascended to at least
the category of subcanonical environmental law by virtue of energy law’s
increasing focus on environmental concerns and the increased appreciation
of its important relationship to environmental issues such as air pollution
and climate change.
Apart from related legal fields, other noncanonical environmental
laws take the form of environmental provisions contained within a statute
not primarily aimed at regulating environmental impacts, or environmental
statutes contained within a larger non-environmental program.
I
collectively refer to these categories as embedded environmental law,
reflecting the incorporation of environmental provisions or statutes into
Embedded
broader non-environmental statutes or programs. 141
138

See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 9-13-1 to -274; Ohio Rev. Code § 1503.01-.99.
See, e.g., Heather Hughes, Securitization and Suburbia, 90 OR. L. REV. 359, 411
(2011) (contending that that “private ordering [is] central to the concerns of
environmental law”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2005) (arguing that “second-order agreements” among
private actors create incentives that affect the implementation of public law regulation).
140
See, e.g., ALAN ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS (1993); DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET
AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT (8th ed. 2011).
141
Embedded environmental laws differ from legal fields or concepts that merely overlap
in application with environmental law. Bankruptcy law, for example, often applies in
circumstances in which environmental law also applies. See, e.g., In re Jensen, 995 F.2d
925 (9th Cir. 1993) (addressing whether claim against business owners for costs of
cleanup of hazardous waste at their former business property was discharged in their
bankruptcy); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984)
(addressing whether Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay precluded state agency from
139
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environmental law—including its distinctive features and importance to
the broader project of environmental law—is the focus of Part II.
II.

Embedded Environmental Law

Embedded environmental laws, a subspecies of noncanonical
environmental law, are contained within a statute or program that is not
primarily aimed at regulating environmental impacts and usually are
administered by an agency that does not specialize in environmental
issues. Essentially, embedded environmental laws are environmental laws
organized with other, nonenvironmental laws. Embedded environmental
laws thus lie within overlapping legal fields—both environmental law and
whatever field they are embedded within.
Embedded environmental laws have heretofore been overlooked,
both individually and collectively, as a category of functionally distinct
environmental law. To a certain extent their obscurity is understandable.
Embedded environmental laws do not compare to the environmental law
canon in terms of size or prominence; they do not belong in the canon.
Embedded environmental laws are hidden away in the law generally,
isolated both substantively and institutionally from other environmental
laws. Many of them are relatively minor provisions with uncertain
environmental impacts or even an uncertain relationship to environmental
concerns. But it is a mistake to ignore embedded environmental laws, in
part precisely because they differ so much from the environmental law
canon, for their differences create the basis for an alternative model of
environmental lawmaking. Embedded environmental laws have the
potential to play an increasing and constructive role in the future of
environmental law.
This Part examines embedded environmental laws as a discrete and
largely ignored category of environmental law. Part II.A identifies four
different types of embedded environmental laws, adding clarity to the
definition of the category. Part II.B then explores how the features
identified in Part I.C, which differentiate among environmental laws, are
manifested in embedded environmental law. Part II.C examines the
implications of those features for how embedded environmental laws
function as compared with the environmental law canon. Finally, Part
II.D argues that embedded environmental law is as an alternative and
parallel system that can complement and substitute for canonical
environmental law, helping environmental law to address some of its
major challenges.
enforcing injunction against bankruptcy debtor to correct violations of various state
environmental protection statutes). This overlap poses interesting and important
questions for the application of both legal fields, see, e.g., Jason S. Brookner,
Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: An Overview, 112 BANKING L.J. 124 (1995);
Stanley M. Spracker & James D. Barnette, The Treatment of Environmental Matters in
Bankruptcy Cases, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 85 (1995), but does not by itself transform
bankruptcy laws into environmental laws.
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Types

Because statutes are not necessarily codified by the same method
of organization as they are enacted, environmental laws can be embedded
at creation only, at implementation only, or at both creation and
implementation:
 An environmental law is embedded only at creation if it is enacted
as part of a non-environmental statute but administered with an
environmental statute or program. For example, the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, 142 which overall was not an environmental law,
including provisions amending the Clean Air Act with respect to
regulation of renewable fuels. 143
 An environmental law is embedded only at implementation if it is
enacted as part of an environmental statute but administered with a
non-environmental statute or program. For example, the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 144 amended the Occupational Safety and
Health Act 145 to require the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to issue “a chemical process safety standard
designed to protect employees from hazards associated with
accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals in the
workplace.” 146
 An environmental law is embedded at both creation and
implementation if it is enacted as part of a non-environmental
statute and codified and administered with a non-environmental
statute or program. For example, Section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966, which restricts the use of certain
parklands and historic areas for federal transportation projects, was
enacted and is codified as part of the Department of
Transportation’s enabling statute. 147
This Part’s examination of embedded environmental laws will
focus on those embedded at both creation and implementation, because
those laws most thoroughly exhibit the distinctive characteristics of
embedded environmental laws and stand in sharpest contrast with
142

Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
Id. § 1501, 119 Stat. at 1067-76 (amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545).
144
Pub.L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
145
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
146
Id. § 304(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655.
147
Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 303); see also, e.g., Airway Improvement Act (“AAIA”), 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(B)
(requiring Federal Aviation Administration to take “every reasonable step” to avoid
approving airport runway development projects that will have “a significant adverse
effect on natural resources”); Electric Consumers Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-495, §
3(a), 100 Stat. 1243, 1243 (1986) (amending Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. §
803(a), to add “the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife
(including related spawning grounds and habitat)" to the required elements of any
hydropower licenses approved by the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission)).
143
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canonical environmental statutes. Its observations and conclusions about
laws embedded at both creation and implementation apply in part,
however, to the functioning of environmental laws embedded only at
creation (and not implementation) or only at implementation. Such
partially embedded environmental laws function as a hybrid of
characteristics associated with conventional environmental laws and
characteristics associated with fully embedded environmental laws. For
example, take the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s amendments to the Clean
Air Act, 148 embedded at creation but not implementation: Enacting the
amendments as part of an energy bill, rather than as part of a statute
focused on the Clean Air Act, likely affected the politics of the
legislation. 149 On the other hand, once EPA incorporated the amendments
into the agency’s ongoing Clean Air Act programs, the amendments
essentially became part of the environmental law canon. Depending on
the objectives and the circumstances, hybridity may pose an advantage or
a disadvantage.
B.

Features

Embedded environmental laws have distinctive features in
common that help both to define the category and to distinguish it from
other environmental laws. Embedded environmental laws are thus more
than just examples of environmental laws outside of the canon; they are
their own coherent category.
Implementing Institution. Whereas most statutes within the
environmental law canon are administered by EPA, and many of the
subcanonical resource statutes are administered by resource agencies with
significant environmental experience and expertise, embedded
environmental laws are often administered by agencies that are not
primarily environmental, such as the Internal Revenue Service’s
administration of an excise tax on ozone-depleting substances, 150 the
Department of Transportation’s administration of Section 4(f) of its
organic act, 151 or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
administration of § 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, requiring hydropower
licenses to provide “adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of
fish and wildlife.” 152
Role of Environmental Protection. As one gets further away from
the environmental law canon, the role of the environment in
environmental laws tends to get less prominent and murkier. The
environment, to the extent it is a focus at all, lacks the claims of primacy
148

See supra notes 142-143.
See infra Part II.C.3 (examining the political characteristics of embedded
environmental laws).
150
26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-4682.
151
Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 303).
152
16 U.S.C. § 803(a).
149
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that it enjoys in the environmental law canon. For example, the excise tax
on ozone-depleting substances was enacted both to protect the
stratospheric ozone layer and to raise revenue. 153 The Plant Protection
Act, 154 which aims to control the spread of plant pests and noxious weeds,
mentions environmental concerns among its statutory objectives but seems
primarily oriented toward protecting the agriculture sector. 155 Similarly,
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 156 among its various provisions, states
six requirements for tribal gaming ordinances for Class II gaming under
the statute; one of those six requirements provides that the gaming must be
“conducted in a manner which adequately protects the environment and
the public health and safety.” 157 This isolated environmental provision is
buried within a statute focused generally on gaming’s ability to promote
tribal economic development and concerns about potentially corrupting
influences such as organized crime. 158 Indeed, for many embedded
environmental laws, even the environmental-ness of the law at all is
unclear. 159
Subject Matter and Media. Consistent with the predominance of
the environmental law canon, when Congress addresses an environmental
problem involving a subject matter or media similar to existing canonical
environmental law, Congress tends to utilize the environmental law canon,
using existing regulatory mechanisms implemented by agencies
specializing in environmental regulation. Thus, for example, Congress
addressed anthropogenic depletion of the stratospheric ozone through the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which directed EPA to regulate
ozone-depleting substances under the Clean Air Act. 160 Congress tends to
enact embedded environmental laws, on the other hand, to address more
novel environmental problems—for example, the invasive plant species
regulated under the Plant Protection Act, airport noise regulated under the
Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act, 161 or marketing of organically
produced products regulated under the Organic Foods Production Act. 162
Breadth. Given their relative obscurity, it is not surprising that
embedded environmental laws are smaller and narrower programs than the
canonical environmental statutes. One of the ways in which embedded
environmental laws are narrow, however, has important functional
implications: many embedded environmental laws target a specific
sector—for example, the Swampbuster and Sodbuster provisions of the
Food Security Act which targets agriculture, Federal Power Act § 10(a)
153

See infra note 215 (describing the history of the tax).
7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7786.
155
See id. § 7701 (setting forth congressional findings).
156
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
157
25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(E).
158
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2702.
159
See infra Part III.C.
160
42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q.
161
49 U.S.C. §§ 47501-47510.
162
7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6522.
154
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which targets hydropower, or Section 4(f) which targets transportation.
Sector-specific environmental laws are more readily embedded into other
non-environmental programs because many non-environmental
government programs are sector-specific and administered by sectorspecific institutions such as the Department of Agriculture, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Transportation.
Despite these patterns, to a significant extent a defining
characteristic of embedded environmental laws is their diversity of
features. Embedded environmental laws are not constrained by the
comparatively homogenous model of the environmental law canon. In
addition to addressing different types of subject matter and media, with
different roles for environmental protection, and administered by different
agencies than the environmental law canon, embedded environmental laws
employ a broader variety of regulatory mechanisms, including taxes,163
incentives, 164 and planning requirements 165 as well as more conventional
regulation. 166

163

26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-4682.
16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3813.
165
Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 303).
166
49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5128. As previously mentioned, see supra Part I.B.2, there are
interesting parallels between the implementation of NEPA and the ESA and the
implementation of embedded environmental laws. Like the administration of embedded
environmental laws, NEPA analyses and ESA consultations are often undertaken by
agencies that are not environmental specialists. See, e.g., Florida Key Deer v. Paulison,
522 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying ESA § 7 to Federal Emergency Management
Agency); Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (applying
NEPA to Federal Communications Commission); Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n v.
Rendell, 210 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying NEPA to Department of Housing and
Urban Development). Agencies apply NEPA and the ESA in conjunction with their
administration of other non-environmental statutes, see, e.g., Florida Key Deer, 522 F.3d
at 1141-44 (applying ESA § 7 to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
implementation of the National Flood Insurance Act); Am. Bird Conservancy, 516 F.3d
1027 (applying NEPA to Federal Communications Commission’s implementation of the
Communications Act of 1934); Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n, 210 F.3d 168 (applying
NEPA to Department of Housing and Urban Development’s implementation of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974), just as agencies often apply
embedded environmental laws in conjunction with their administration of broader nonenvironmental programs. For example, the Department of Transportation implements
Section 4(f)’s environmental requirements in conjunction with its broader administration
of transportation funding under the Department of Transportation Act, see, e.g., Laguna
Greenbelt, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 42 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994); and the Department of
Agriculture implements Swampbuster’s environmental requirements in conjunction with
its broader administration of farm subsidy programs, see, e.g., Gunn v. U.S. Dept. of
Agric., 118 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 1997). In both types of situations, the presence of the
environmental law—NEPA, the ESA, or an embedded environmental statute—integrates
environmental concerns with other policy objectives.
164
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Implications

Canonical environmental law is integrated with other
environmental law. For example, a federal regulation restricting air
pollutant emissions from a power plant 167 is integrated with other federal
air pollution regulation—administered by the same sub-agency (EPA’s
Office of Air and Radiation), as part of the same statutory program (Clean
Air Act). Canonical environmental law is segregated, however, from nonenvironmental law—the same federal regulation restricting air pollutant
emissions from a power plant is not integrated, for example, with labor
standards 168 that apply to the power plant.
Embedded environmental law, on the other hand, is segregated
from environmental law but integrated with some body of nonenvironmental law with which it shares other attributes. For example,
Section 4(f) is integrated with transportation programs in the Department
of Transportation but segregated from programs that apply to parklands. 169
Comparing embedded environmental laws and the environmental
law canon thus implicates questions about how to organize the law—in
essence, comparing how a particular environmental provision would
function as part of a broader environmental statute administered by an
agency specializing in environmental policy, with how it would function
as part of a program focused on the regulated activity. 170 One way to
think about how law should be organized in its enactment and
administration is in terms of complementarities of function, which can be
used to decide whether functions should be coordinated or administered
independently. 171 Where functions are complementary, there are likely to
167

See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40Da-.52Da (setting forth Standards of Performance for
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units).
168
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.1-.60 (regulating wage payments under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938).
169
In this respect, NEPA and the Endangered Species Act operate differently than other
statutes in the environmental law canon. See supra Part I.B.2. Because much of the
responsibility for implementing NEPA and, albeit to a lesser extent, the Endangered
Species Act rests with non-environmental agencies implementing what are otherwise
non-environmental programs, see supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text, the
administration of NEPA and the Endangered Species Act resembles the administration of
an embedded environmental law. When NEPA requires the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to prepare an Environmental Assessment before approving a housing
redevelopment project, for example, it is as if NEPA has been embedded in HUD’s
housing program. This is not just a question of overlapping application, as it would be
with a Clean Water Act requirement that applied to the housing project. NEPA integrates
into HUD’s program, actually becoming part of the agency’s process for approving the
housing project.
170
Cf. Eric Biber, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of
Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 79 (2012) (“A key question is
whether you want to manage the externality-causing activity separately from the
externality, or together.”).
171
See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 988-97 (2004).
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be benefits from coordinating those functions. 172
Embedded
environmental law offers the possibility that, in a particular situation, there
may be greater complementarity of function among certain environmental
and non-environmental provisions that govern the same activity than
among environmental provisions that govern a particular type of
environmental harm.
Lawmakers producing environmental law choose—whether
deliberately or inadvertently—what form the law should take. In choosing
whether to address an environmental problem by adding a new provision
modeled on the environmental law canon or by enacting a new embedded
environmental provision, lawmakers should carefully consider the
implications of the differences between the two.
The remainder of this section compares how the differences in the
features of canonical and embedded environmental laws affect the ways in
which they function legally, institutionally, and politically. The purpose
of this functional comparison is not to claim that embedded environmental
law is categorically superior to canonical environmental law, or vice versa.
Rather, the specific context in which a law applies determines whether a
particular functional characteristic poses an advantage or disadvantage.
1.

Legal Functions

Ideally laws would exhibit an attribute of comprehensive and
complete coherence—that is, perfect coherence across all possible axes of
comparison. A federal statute regulating air pollutant emissions from
coal-fired power plants, for example, ideally would be entirely coherent
with other federal air pollution regulation; with other federal
environmental regulation; with other federal non-environmental regulation
of power plants and of the electricity they generate; and with state and
local environmental and non-environmental regulation of power plants.
Without such coherence, laws can work inefficiently, operate at crosspurposes, or even conflict.
Purposeful coherence, however, is costly to attain. It requires
coordination—potentially, coordination at every stage of the legal process:
during the enactment of the legislation, during the agency proceedings to
implement the legislation, and during the enforcement process.
Comprehensive and complete coherence across the entire web of
interrelated laws is infeasible. Realistically, then, coherence will be
limited at best, and lawmakers face a tradeoff in deciding what coherence
to prioritize.
The way in which the law is organized increases the salience of
certain of its characteristics, thereby facilitating the coherence of laws that
share those characteristics. A massive environmental statute such as the
Clean Air Act may be sprawling, complex, and far from comprehensively
172

Id. Assessing functional complementarity with any specificity, however, can be very
difficult. Id. at 997.
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coherent, but it exhibits certain discernible internal patterns. Accordingly
a regulatory provision within the Clean Air Act is more likely to be
coherent with other provisions of the Act than with a provision of another
statute. Similarly, a provision of a Farm Bill is more likely to be coherent
with another provision of the Farm Bill than with the Clean Water Act.
The relative merit of creating a new environmental provision as
part of an environmental statute or by embedding it in a nonenvironmental statute thus depends in significant part on whether greater
value in the particular situation seems to arise from coherence with other
environmental laws or coherence with other non-environmental laws that
address the same conduct. Canonical environmental law—environmental
law organized with other environmental law—is more likely to produce
internal coherence and consistency within the field of environmental law.
Embedded environmental law—environmental law organized with other
non-environmental law—is more likely to generate coherence and
consistency in the law of the field in which it is embedded.
The benefits of coherence, moreover, likely increase as the
concentration of regulation in the sector increases. 173
Thus, in
ascertaining whether a new environmental policy would function better if
enacted within existing environmental programs (canonical environmental
law) or with other non-environmental programs targeting the same
industry (embedded environmental law), policymakers should compare the
relative intensity of regulation in each sphere, all else equal favoring
placement of the new law in the more intense sphere, at what one might
call the regulatory center of gravity.
Thus, it makes sense to regulate corporate disclosure of
environmental liabilities as part of a program regulating corporate
disclosures rather than as part of a program focusing on environmental
liabilities.174 Existing securities laws intensively regulate other, nonenvironmentally related corporate disclosures. 175 On the other hand,
although environmental regulatory programs such as CERCLA create
environmental liabilities, they do not generally regulate the disclosure of
such liabilities. The center of regulatory gravity for corporate disclosure
of environmental liability, and accordingly the likely greatest benefit from
coherence, is located within the programs regulating corporate disclosures
(embedded environmental law) rather than within environmental
regulatory programs (canonical environmental law).
In weighing the relative merits of organizing new environmental
law with existing environmental programs or separate from those existing
173

On the other hand, the costs of coordination also substantially increase as the intensity
of regulation increases—the more there is to coordinate, the more difficult it is to
coordinate.
174
See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75
Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010); see generally John W. Bagby et. al., How Green Was My
Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
225 (1995).
175
See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229.
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programs, the relative conduciveness of each form to innovation may be
an important consideration. In particular, coherence with existing law can
be a drag on innovation. By its very nature, coherence pushes in the
direction of conformity rather than diversity. The framework of existing
statutes therefore constrains options for regulatory innovation within those
programs. 176 Even statutory amendments usually accomplish only
incremental change. 177 Thus, addressing an environmental problem by
making changes within the environmental law canon will likely result in a
new environmental law that looks more like existing environmental law
than if the problem is addressed by enacting a new provision of embedded
environmental law, separate from the extant canon.
Embedded
environmental law, less burdened by the need to conform to existing
environmental programs, provides a structure more conducive to
experimentation and policy innovation than are canonical environmental
statutes.
Another important consideration is the organization of the field
into which the environmental provision is embedded.
Just as
178
environmental law has its own internal organization, other fields do as
well, probably including some hierarchical order of prominence. The
effectiveness of an environmental provision embedded into another field
likely depends on how the environmental provision integrates with the
field. To the extent the other field has canonical statutes with heightened
salience within that field, and concomitant higher levels of attention and
resources, an environmental provision embedded within one of those
canonical statutes would likely be more efficacious than if it were
embedded in a less prominent statute. The effect of the Swampbuster
provision of the Food Security Act and of Section 4(f) of the Department
of Transportation Act are enhanced, for example, because the Food
Security Act—a Farm Bill—and the Department of Transportation Act are
canonical within their respective fields of agricultural law and
transportation law. On the other hand, precisely because of the salience of
a canonical statute within its field, it may be politically more difficult to
embed an environmental provision in a canonical statute of another field
than in a statute that is more obscure to the field.
2.

Institutional Functions

Embedded environmental law also differs fundamentally from the
environmental law canon because the agencies that administer embedded
176

See Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case
for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 480 (1996) (noting that “a truly new
regulatory system cannot be implemented within the existing legal framework”).
177
Even the massive and dramatic Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101–
549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), which significantly revamped the Clean Air Act and was
many times longer than the original Clean Air Act of 1970, for the most part added new
elements to existing programs and did not replace the existing statutory programs.
178
See supra Part I.B.
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environmental laws differ from EPA. EPA is the acknowledged
environmental expert and specialist in the Executive Branch. The
agency’s mission focuses on environmental protection. 179 Even for
programs that Congress delegates to another agency, as to issues that
implicate environmental concerns Congress often directs the
implementing agency to coordinate with EPA. 180 EPA has accumulated a
staff of thousands of environmental experts with which no other federal
agency can compete. 181
Embedded environmental law thus poses institutional challenges,
because it puts environmental lawmaking in the hands of administrative
agencies that lack experience and expertise—and perhaps motivation as
well—in addressing environmental protection. For many agencies,
environmental protection is a secondary goal, and potentially perceived to
be at odds with the agency’s other, primary goals. 182 Based on these
factors, it might seem that delegating an environmental program to an
agency other than EPA would invariably pose a disadvantage to the
effectiveness of the program.
But EPA is far from perfect. It is already overburdened with
existing statutory mandates. 183 It is highly bureaucratic in ways that may
impair its ability to respond with speed and agility to new policy
challenges. 184 Violent swings of the political pendulum have left the
agency with what William Ruckelshaus, its first Administrator, has called
“battered agency syndrome.” 185 EPA also has traditionally concentrated
on pollution and public health; the agency may have less institutional
advantage in addressing environmental problems that lie outside of these
realms.
179

EPA, Our Mission and What We Do, http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/whatwedo.html
(“The mission of EPA is to protect human health and the environment.”).
180
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 349 (directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
consult with EPA after it has issued a new drinking water regulation under the Safe
Drinking Water Act regarding whether to promulgate regulations applying the EPA
regulation to bottled drinking water).
181
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
REPORT NO. 11-P-0136, EPA NEEDS BETTER AGENCY-WIDE CONTROLS OVER STAFF
RESOURCES (Feb. 22, 2011) (reporting that the agency employed somewhat over 18,000
people during Fiscal Years 2006-2010).
182
See Todd S. Aagaard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties under
NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 115 (2012); cf. Eric Biber, Too Many Things
to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 6-30 (2009) (describing the tendency of multiple-goal agencies to focus on
certain primary goals at the expense of secondary goals).
183
See Lakshman Guruswamy, Integration & Biocomplexity, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1191,
1233 (2001) (referring to EPA as “harassed and overburdened”); William D.
Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 25, 26 (“Any senior
EPA official will tell you that the agency has the resources to do not much more than ten
percent of the things Congress has charged it to do.”).
184
See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S16845 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Baucus) (criticizing “EPA’s bloated bureaucratic process”)
185
Ruckelshaus, supra note 192, at 25.
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Moreover, despite their relative lack of expertise on environmental
issues, non-environmental agencies may better understand the nonenvironmental dimensions of a problem. Drawing again on the example
of corporate disclosures of environmental liabilities, 186 the SEC may not
have EPA’s deep expertise on issues environmental liability, but it has
much stronger experience than EPA on issues of corporate disclosure, and
that expertise may be more relevant than environmental expertise to the
overall success of corporate disclosures of environmental liabilities.
Other agencies also may be more willing and able to depart from
the environmental law canon’s paradigm that dominates EPA. Agencies
are notorious for their predilection toward the status quo and against
dramatic change. 187 Delegating a new environmental program to EPA, an
agency with an existing heavy environmental docket, is thus likely to
result in a new program that strongly resembles existing EPA programs.
Delegating a new environmental program to an agency such as the
Department of Agriculture, which focuses far less on environmental
regulation, puts the agency in a position of writing policy on a relatively
cleaner slate. At the very least, the institutional tendencies of a nonenvironmental agency such as the Department of Agriculture are likely to
be based on its existing programs that differ significantly from the
environmental law canon. The Swampbuster provision of the Food
Security Act, for example, has features consistent with existing agriculture
programs built around subsidy programs but functions quite differently
from the Clean Water Act’s wetlands program. 188
The prospect of dispersing environmental programs across
agencies throughout the federal government may induce concerns of
fragmentation, which “can yield conflicting policies that frustrate each
other, or duplicative policies that waste effort . . . [or] gaps [that are]
unaddressed.” 189
But all regulation is fragmented across some
dimensions, and so delegating all federal regulatory authority over
environmental issues to EPA would fragment environmental regulations
from other non-environmental regulations that apply to the same industry.
Even environmental programs are generally fragmented by environmental
media.
186

See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2263 (2001)
(noting bureaucracies’ tendency toward “inertia and torpor”)
188
See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
189
Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in
Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 218 (2008). For other examples of the
ample academic literature noting the problems of fragmentation, see, e.g., James M.
Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 11-12 (2000); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1147-48 (2012); Samuel J. Rascoff &
Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in
Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI L. REV. 1763, 1814-15
(2002).
187
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The question, then, is not whether to fragment regulatory
programs—they must be fragmented—but rather which shared features to
organize together and which to fragment. Fragmenting across some
dimensions—for example, allocating regulatory authority over
environmental problems across multiple agencies—may allow integrating
others, such as coordinated environmental and non-environmental
regulation of a particular sector.
In sum, the question of whether an environmental or nonenvironmental agency would most effectively administer an
environmental provision does not as clearly favor the environmental
agency as one might initially assume. Environmental agencies have the
advantage of environmental expertise and focus, but non-environmental
agencies offer their own advantages. In particular, the organization of
embedded environmental laws 190 and their institutional setting 191 may
work in combination to free embedded environmental laws from the
constraints of existing environmental regulatory systems and provide
circumstances conducive for experimental environmental lawmaking and
closer coordination with non-environmental programs.
3.

Political Functions

As political conditions such as the degree of partisanship and the
particular parties in power of the Presidency and Congress change, the
viability of different forms of legislation changes as well. Differences in
the features of embedded environmental laws and the environmental law
canon lead them to function differently politically, in ways that likely
affect their relative political viability.
First, the mere existence of an alternative to the canonical form of
environmental law increases the political viability of enacting some new
environmental law. EPA and its canonical regulatory programs have
sometimes been 192—as they are currently 193—a political lightning rod.
The backlash against EPA represents not only resistance to concrete
aspects of the agency’s specific programs, but also considerable use of
EPA as a symbol of excessive and heavy-handed regulation more
generally. Such conditions pose a substantial obstacle to any legislation
that would attempt to invest EPA with additional authority, and also
reduces the agency’s ability to effectively implement its existing
authorities. In such circumstances, environmental legislation in the
canonical form is politically infeasible. 194 Environmental provisions
190

See supra Part II.C.1.
See supra Part II.C.2.
192
See William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at
25, 25 (describing a pattern of alternating “pro-environmental excess” and “antienvironmental excess” that caused EPA to suffer from “battered agency syndrome”).
193
See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also infra note 233.
194
Environmental legislation may, however, be more politically viable than alternatives.
Pennsylvania’s recently enacted Act 13 governing natural gas drilling in the state imposes
charges on unconventional natural gas wells. The Republican governor, Tom Corbett,
191
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within larger non-environmental legislation that delegates to agencies
other than EPA, on the other hand, may remain viable.
Even in circumstances in which Congress might be willing to
invest EPA with additional new authority, embedded environmental
legislation may remain politically attractive. In conferring authority on
EPA, Congress may be concerned whether the agency will be willing and
able to act on its delegated authority. 195 Congress can mitigate the risk of
EPA implementation failure, or indeed implementation failure by any
particular agency, by legislating across multiple fronts—e.g., multiple
embedded environmental laws administered by different agencies, or both
canonical and embedded environmental laws—thereby improving the
likelihood that some policy to address the problem will be
implemented. 196 Delegating environmental laws across a broader range of
institutions could allow other agencies to implement substitute policies
when EPA is stymied.
Second, the politics of embedded environmental laws differ from
the politics of the environmental law canon because embedded
environmental laws are part of legislation and programs that do not focus
overall on environmental protection. Major legislation focused on
environmental protection generally has no advantages over the status quo
to offer the would-be regulated industries, as a result of which the
regulated industries generally have strong incentive to attempt to kill
environmental legislation. 197 Some state governments, moreover, may
resist large-scale expansions of federal environmental regulation that
displaces more lenient state-level regulation and pressures state

has successfully defended the charges as an impact fee rather than a tax. See Brad
Bumsted, Corbett Disputes Claim that Impact Fee Is Tax, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Nov.
22, 2011 (noting Governor Corbett’s argument that the levy on unconventional natural
gas drilling is not a tax but “a fee to cover government costs associated with drilling”).
But see Elizabeth Stelle & Nathan Benefield, What's the Difference Between a Tax and a
Fee?,
Commonwealth
Foundation
(May
31,
2011),
http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/policyblog/detail/whats-the-differencebetween-a-tax-and-a-fee (arguing that “there are many reasons why [the impact fee] more
closely represents a tax than a fee”). Evidently new taxes can be even more politically
combustible than new environmental regulation.
195
Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 923, 990 n.84 (2008) (“The EPA's pattern of missing statutory deadlines
has been well documented.”).
196
See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 292-94 (2011) (noting that redundant
delegations of regulatory authority can increase the likelihood of successful regulatory
action).
197
But see RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 209 (2d ed. 2006)
(noting that industries in the 1960s “acquired a powerful new interest in obtaining
moderate and uniform federal standards that would preempt more stringent and
inconsistent state and local standards,” laying the foundation for a national Clean Air
Act).
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governments into assisting in implementation. 198
Embedded
environmental provisions, by contrast, are contained within statutes that
focus on goals other than environmental protection, many of which may
be advantageous to an industry. Thus, for example, the Food Security
Act 199 contained two environmental provisions—known as Sodbuster200
and Swampbuster 201—that condition farmers’ eligibility for many Federal
farm program benefits on minimum standards of protection for certain
environmentally sensitive lands. 202 Although farmers may have opposed
the Sodbuster and Swampbuster restrictions in isolation, the overall Food
Security Act included numerous provisions, such as price supports and
farm loans, that benefited farmers. 203
Third, the political stakes will tend to be smaller for embedded
environmental laws than for major environmental legislation. Embedded
environmental laws tend to impose lighter economic burdens on a
narrower range of regulatory targets, and therefore invite less political
opposition than a major environmental statute. By contrast, even a
relatively insignificant amendment to a canonical environmental statute
can implicate large political stakes, because one attempt to amend a statute
can be perceived to create opportunities for other amendments to the
statute, quickly escalating the stakes for what started as a proposal for a
small change. 204 Thus, the same provision could be politically far less
combustible in terms of environmental politics as a provision of a larger
piece of non-environmental legislation than as an amendment to a major
environmental statute. On the other hand, the politics of the other field
into which an embedded environmental law is inserted are important as
well.
Embedding environmental provisions in non-environmental
legislation is likely to be more politically viable than amending a major
environmental statute primarily in situations in which the non198

See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1995) (“State and local governments
argue that federal regulations infringe on their autonomy and sovereignty, and that they
impose costly unfunded mandates states can ill afford.”).
199
Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
200
Id. § 1211-1213, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3813.
201
Id. § 1221-1223, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3823.
202
Sodbuster denies eligibility to farmers who convert highly erodible land to crop
production without an approved soil conservation system. 16 U.S.C. § 3811.
Swampbuster denies eligibility to farmers who convert a wetland to crop production. 16
U.S.C. § 3821.
203
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 401, 99 Stat. at 1395-1406 (providing loan program
for feed grains); id. § 801, 99 Stat. at 1441-43 (providing price support for soybeans).
204
Cf. Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case
for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 480 (1996) (“None of these
constituencies is willing to abandon the existing legal and regulatory framework without
assurances that their agendas will be protected.”); Roger P. Hansen & Theodore A.
Wolff, Reviewing NEPA's Past: Improving NEPA's Future, 13 ENVT. PRAC. 235 (2011)
(“The problem with amending NEPA is that it opens a Pandora’s box of amendments
offered by vocal NEPA opponents to weaken, water down, or even eliminate NEPA or its
effectiveness.”).
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environmental legislation falls within a field in which there is less political
controversy than in environmental policy. 205
Fourth, the fact that embedded environmental law is dispersed and
involves comparatively low stakes may make it a more difficult target for
political organizing by interest groups. This may give Congress and
agencies more discretion and autonomy in making environmental law out
of the political spotlight. The difficulties of political organizing with
regard to embedded environmental laws may, however, disproportionately
burden environmental groups. Industry groups likely are already well
organized with respect to the various congressional committees and
agencies that regulate them and who would be responsible for new
embedded environmental laws—for example, the congressional
agriculture committees. Environmental groups, on the other hand, would
tend to be better organized and familiar with the committees and agencies
responsible for canonical environmental law—for example, the House
Natural Resources Committee and the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee. Moreover, whereas EPA is sometimes accused of
exhibiting bias against industry, 206 sector-specific agencies such as the
Department of Agriculture and Department of Transportation are often
characterized as captured by their respective industries. 207
Thus,
embedded environmental laws may tend to be less stringent than
environmental laws in a canonical form. But canonical environmental
legislation is often not politically viable; embedded environmental laws
may sometimes be the only available option.
Despite the potential advantages of embedded environmental laws,
one type of embedded environmental law—appropriations riders—
exemplifies the potential downsides to non-canonical environmental
legislation. Appropriations riders are isolated legislative provisions
attached to larger appropriations bills to take advantage of the larger bill’s
political momentum and the relative lack of process and deliberation in
appropriations legislation. 208 Environmental appropriations riders, often
205

How the embedded environmental law fits into the field in which it is embedded also
affects its political viability. The political difficulty of embedding an environmental
provision in a statute of another field likely increases as the salience of the statute in the
other field increases, although the efficacy of an environmental provision embedded in a
statute of another field likely also increases as the salience of the statute in the other field
increases. See supra Part II.C.1.
206
See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS MINORITY STAFF,
EPA’S ANTI-INDUSTRIAL POLICY: “THREATENING JOBS AND AMERICA’S
MANUFACTURING BASE” (Sept. 28, 2010). But see Jeff Nesmith, Senators Attack
Mercury Proposal, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 13, 2004 (reporting senators’ allegation
that proposed EPA regulation showed pro-industry bias).
207
See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 104 n.148 (1994) (contending that industry-specific agencies are
susceptible to capture by their respective industries)
208
Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in
Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 635-36 (2006). Perhaps the most (in)famous
environmental appropriations rider is the Energy and Water Development Appropriation
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creating exemptions from environmental requirements, have proliferated
in recent decades, 209 roughly coinciding with the ongoing legislative
stagnation on broader environmental legislation. As Richard Lazarus has
observed, this development represents a trend away from “coherent,
comprehensive environmental legislation” and toward appropriations
riders as an important form of environmental legislation, a development
that Lazarus criticizes as “nondeliberative, back-door, private dealmaking”
that undermines deliberative democracy. 210
Although environmental appropriations riders pose a cautionary
example regarding the potential for democratically unsound embedded
environmental laws, many embedded environmental laws do not share the
defects of appropriations riders. Embedded environmental laws such as
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act 211 and the
Swampbuster and Sodbuster provisions of the Food Security Act 212
embody constructive environmental policies enacted through a standard
legislative process.
Accordingly, the example of environmental
appropriations riders serves as a cautionary reminder to how embedded
environmental laws can be misused, but does not support a categorical
critique of embedded environmental laws.
D.

Weighing Advantages and Disadvantages

As the discussion in Part II.C indicates, the distinctive features of
noncanonical environmental laws present both benefits and costs in terms
of effectiveness, and each of the potentially useful features of embedded
environmental laws has a possible downside as well:
 Embedding environmental law provisions in non-environmental
statutes and programs may result in more coherence among those
laws, but perhaps at the cost of inconsistency with other
environmental laws.

Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979), which overrode the
Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
holding that the Endangered Species Act prohibited completion of the Tellico Dam
project in Tennessee because it would destroy the endangered snail darter’s habitat.
209
Id. at 640-47.
210
Id. at 622; see also Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar
of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 476
(1997). But see Scott H. Segal & Jonathan H. Adler, Appropriations Riders and
Environmental Reform: How Appropriate? 13 (Competitive Enterprise Institute
Environmental Discussion Paper 95-3, Sept. 15, 1995) (arguing that appropriations riders
are a beneficial “means of holding unresponsive agencies in check”). Not all
environmental appropriations riders are “anti-environmental.” See, e.g., Department of
the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-54, §§ 104-106, 119 Stat. 499, 521-22 (2007) (restricting offshore oil and gas leasing
in certain areas); H.R. Rep. No. 111-316, at 109 (2009) (directing EPA “to carry out a
study on the relationship between hydraulic fracturing and drinking water”).
211
49 U.S.C. § 303.
212
16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3813, 3821-3823.
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Delegating environmental protection to agencies other than EPA
may broaden the scope of environmental law and policy, but other
agencies may lack expertise to understand complex environmental
issues or commitment to environmental protection.
 Non-environmental agencies may enjoy a less acrimonious
relationship with the private sector, but they also may be less
assertive regulators as well.
 Dispersed programs may be more agile and conducive to
experimentation, but they also may be more susceptible to
regulatory capture and may exhibit the disadvantages of
fragmentation.
Because of their potential downsides, embedded environmental
laws as a category do not always function better than canonical
environmental laws. In many circumstances, the ideal environmental
statute may take the form of “comprehensive environmental legislation”
that Richard Lazarus rightly lauds as the backbone of American
environmental policy. 213 But broad canonical environmental statutes are
not necessarily more effective than embedded environmental provisions in
every instance.
And even when perhaps theoretically preferable,
canonical environmental legislation often is politically not viable. Thus,
embedded environmental law provides a superior alternative to canonical
environmental law either where it is functionally superior to canonical
environmental law or where canonical environmental law is not available.
In addition to the possibility of substituting for canonical
environmental law, embedded environmental laws also can serve as a
valuable supplement to canonical environmental laws. Here are two
examples of environmental laws administered by non-environmental
agencies and embedded within non-environmental programs, working
synergistically with canonical environmental statutes administered by
EPA.
First, the Internal Revenue Code imposes an excise tax on ozonedepleting chemicals, with the amount of the tax increasing over time and
with the ozone-depleting potential of the substance. 214 The excise tax,
enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, 215
213

Lazarus, supra note 208, at 622.
26 U.S.C. §§ 4681-4682; see also 26 C.F.R. § 52.4682–1.
215
Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989). The tax came to be enacted through an
“almost serendipitous consensus.” Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of
Environmental Excise Taxes, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 136-37 (1994). The World
Resources Institute had advocated for a tax on ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons in a
1986 report. J. Andrew Hoerner, Taxing Pollution, in OZONE PROTECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES 39, 39 (Elizabeth Cook, ed. 1996). In 1989, President George H.W.
Bush, following an earlier similar proposal from EPA under the Reagan Administration,
see 53 Fed. Reg. 30,604 (Aug. 12, 1988) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking asking
for public comment on a possible fee or auction for ozone-depleting substances),
proposed to restrict the consumption and production of chemicals that deplete
stratospheric ozone by auctioning the rights to produce such chemicals. See Barthold,
supra, at 136-37. Meanwhile, a Congressional Budget Resolution had directed the House
214
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supplements other regulatory initiatives, undertaken pursuant to the
Montreal Protocol and enacted as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, that directly limit production and consumption of ozone-depleting
substances. 216 Some have concluded the excise tax has been “probably
more effective in eliminating the production of offending chemicals than
the regulatory provisions” it was intended to supplement. 217
Second, a provision of the Federal Aid Highways Act 218
establishes the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) Program,
which authorizes the Department of Transportation to use federal
transportation funding to support transportation projects that contribute to
air quality improvements. 219 Some specific elements of the program
specifically target projects that contribute to a state’s efforts to attain a
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) under the Clean Air
Act. 220 The CMAQ Program is consistent with a provision in the Clean
Air Act prohibiting any “department, agency, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government” from approving or assisting “any activity” that does
not conform to a state’s efforts, through a state implementation plan (SIP),
to attain a National Ambient Air Quality Standard. 221 The CMAQ
Program, however, goes beyond merely prohibiting efforts that undermine
air quality and provides affirmative support for projects that improve air
quality. Congress added the CMAQ Program to the Federal Aid
Highways Act as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991. 222
Embedded environmental laws also work synergistically with
NEPA, a canonical environmental statute not administered by EPA. When
NEPA and embedded environmental laws apply in conjunction with each

Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee to raise more revenue.
See id. at 137; Hoerner, supra, at 41. Individual members of both committees already
had proposed bills that included taxes on ozone-depleting substances, motivated in part to
raise revenue and in part to address ozone depletion. See Barthold, supra, at 137;
Hoerner, supra, at 40-41. The convergence of efforts to limit ozone-depleting and an
objective to raise tax revenue created conditions conducive to the bipartisan support that
enacted the excise tax. See Barhold, supra, at 137. The dual objectives of the tax—to
protect the ozone layer and to raise revenue—highlight how the tax, like other embedded
environmental laws, falls within the fields of both tax law and environmental law.
216
53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (Aug. 12, 1988). The Clean Air Act provisions are codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671m.
217
John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National
Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 93 (1998).
218
23 U.S.C. §§ 101-190.
219
23 U.S.C. § 149.
220
See 23 U.S.C. § 149(b)(1)(A)(i).
221
42 U.S.C. § 7506; see generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Improving TransportationRelated Air Quality Under the Clean Air Act's Conformity Requirement and the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 631 (1997)
(describing the background of this conformity requirement).
222
Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 1008, 105 Stat. 1914, 1932 (1991).
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other, 223 NEPA’s primary contribution differs from its usual role of
integrating environmental concerns with other policy objectives. The
embedded environmental laws already put environmental concerns on the
agency’s agenda. NEPA, however, integrates embedded environmental
laws into a broader body of environmental law—NEPA law—that
establishes a process and framework for considering environmental
concerns. This process and framework are especially important for
agencies that lack significant environmental experience and expertise. At
the same time, because NEPA’s dictates are broad and only procedural, it
allows agencies the flexibility to tailor their NEPA processes to their own
specific statutory directives. NEPA essentially provides institutional
support for the implementation of embedded environmental laws. 224
Together, these three examples illustrate how embedded
environmental statutory provisions can supplement and complement
canonical environmental statutes. Even if they will never and should
never fully displace conventional environmental laws, noncanonical
environmental laws deserve consideration as a potentially useful tool in
the environmental law toolbox.
E.

Looking Forward: Three Challenges for Next-Generation
Environmental Law

Although to date embedded environmental law has been
overshadowed by the environmental law canon, it has the potential to play
a much more significant role in environmental law moving forward. In
particular, embedded environmental law, by virtue of its differences from
the environmental law canon, offers an alternative model for
environmental lawmaking that may complement, or even to some extent
substitute for, more conventional policy responses in addressing the major
challenges currently facing environmental law. Part II.E will discuss the
potential application of embedded environmental law to meeting three
such challenges:
legislative stagnation, integration with nonenvironmental law, and climate change. The attributes of embedded
environmental law identified in Part II.B make embedded environmental
laws a valuable and perhaps essential component of an effective solution
to these challenges.

223

See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 613 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.
2010) (applying NEPA and the Plant Protection Act to the Department of Agriculture’s
regulation of importation of solid wood packaging material); Laguna Greenbelt, 42 F.3d
517 (applying NEPA and Section 4(f) to the Federal Highway Administration’s approval
of a tollroad project).
224
This is not to say, however, that an agency can or should attempt to meld the statutes
entirely. See, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 203 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (noting that, “[a]lthough an agency's analysis under NEPA and the
Transportation Act might proceed in similar tracks, the two statutes are not precisely the
same,” and proceeding to identify differences therein).
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Stagnation

Environmental law, at least in Congress, has stagnated. Canonical
environmental legislation, by virtue of the size of the programs it enacts
and the costs it imposes on the industries it regulates, automatically
generates resistance and therefore requires tremendous political support to
be enacted. The landmark federal environmental statutes that comprise
the environmental law canon required—and received—broad bipartisan
support in Congress when they were enacted in the 1970s. Support for
environmental protection was a consensus issue. 225
Political conditions have changed dramatically since the 1970s.
Commentators describe a climate of “bitter partisan gridlock” 226 and a
“starkly partisan divide” 227 on environmental issues in Congress. Since
the 1970s Democrats and Republicans in Congress have sharply diverged
in their support for environmental protection. 228 Environmental issues
have become a proxy for an ideological battle over the appropriate extent
of federal regulatory authority. 229 “What began in 1970 as a relatively
bipartisan political issue has become, thirty years later, a largely partisan
issue about which there is little common ground between the two political
parties . . . .” 230
Whatever the causes of the loss of political consensus and the
increasing politicization of environmental issues at the federal level, 231 the
current political context is highly inhospitable to the enactment of major
environmental legislation and has been so for quite some time. Indeed,
environmental lawmaking in Congress has been largely at an impasse for
two decades now. The last major federal environmental statute was the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 232 The impasse shows no signs of

225

See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 8, at 224 (noting that in the early 1970s “solidly
bipartisan majorities [in Congress] vested this new agency [EPA] with sweeping new
powers”); Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1003 n.17 (noting the “sweeping majorities” and
“lopsided votes” that enacted environmental statutes in the 1970s). This is not to imply
that the enactment of major federal environmental statutes during these periods was nonpolitical. See generally, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN
COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
226
Andrews, supra note 8, at 255 (“For the present, it is clear that any hope of significant
environmental policy reform in Congress continues to be held hostage to bitter partisan
gridlock . . . .”).
227
Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1004 (“Today, however, a starkly partisan divide exists in
environmental law.”).
228
Id. at 1012-13.
229
See Andrews, supra note 8, at 238.
230
Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1019.
231
See ANDREWS, supra note 197, at 350-51 (discussing some causes, including a
reassertion of organized opposition from business interests, passive public support, and
the use of the environment as a symbolic issue).
232
Pub. L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). Congress enacted two somewhat
significant environmental statutes in 1996—the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489; and the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613—but neither would qualify as part of the
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abating; if anything, the prospects for significant new federal
environmental legislation seem bleaker than ever. EPA has become a
political lightning rod, a target for ridicule by Republican political
candidates and congressional leaders. 233 In the face of congressional
inaction, EPA is forced to use old statutes to address new environmental
issues.
In the current era of extreme partisanship and political stalemate,
especially in environmental policy, embedded environmental law’s
distinctive features are likely to give it more political viability than
canonical environmental law. Embedded environmental laws avoid EPA,
instead delegating authority to agencies such as the Department of
Agriculture that may enjoy more bipartisan support in Congress.
Embedded environmental laws can be part of a legislative package, such
as an energy policy bill or farm bill, that contains many elements
advantageous to industry. Embedded environmental laws involve smaller
political stakes, and are more conducive to innovative and experimental
policy solutions that may enjoy broader political appeal.
Recent legislative events support the proposition that
environmental laws outside the canon may be more politically viable than
environmental laws in a canonical form. Despite the legislative gridlock
of the last decade, Congress recently has enacted some significant—not
major, but nevertheless significant—pieces of environmental legislation:
 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006 234 amended and reauthorized the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 235
the primary federal statute regulating fisheries. 236
 The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 237 also known
as the 2008 Farm Bill, contained a provision that significantly
amended the Lacey Act, 238 a 1900 statute that prohibits trafficking
in illegal fish, wildlife, or plants. The 2008 amendments expanded
the Lacey Act’s scope to include more plants and plant products,
including illegally logged timber. 239

environmental law canon, a major environmental law on the order of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 or the landmark legislation of the 1970s.
233
See, e.g., Robin Bravender & Gabriel Nelson, Republicans Blitz Obama Over EPA's
'Anti-Industrial' Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010; John M. Broder, Bashing
E.P.A. Is New Theme in G.O.P. Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011; John M. Broder,
House Votes to Bar E.P.A. From Regulating Industrial Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2011.
234
Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007).
235
16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891d.
236
See Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean Ecosystems: Historical
Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 649, 668
(2002).
237
Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008).
238
16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378.
239
Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 8204, 122 Stat. at 2052-56.
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The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, 240 an
amalgamation of 164 separate bills relating to public lands, among
other things designated millions of acres of new wilderness and a
thousand miles of new wild and scenic rivers. 241
All three of these statutes exhibit markedly non-canonical
characteristics. The Lacey Act amendment exemplifies the features of
embedded environmental law.
Although the Magnuson-Stevens
amendments and the Omnibus Public Land statute fall within the category
of subcanonical environmental laws rather than embedded environmental
laws, they share several key features in common with embedded
environmental laws, and these features contribute to their political
viability.
First, none of these new statutes is administered by EPA. The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), an agency
within the Department of Commerce, administers the Magnuson-Stevens
Act. 242 The Department of Agriculture, and specifically the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service, enforces the new Lacey Act
provisions. 243 Various federal land management agencies, such as the
Bureau of Land Management, Forest Service, and National Park Service,
administer the newly designated public lands. 244
Second, all three statutes pursue additional objectives beyond
environmental concerns—that is, they are “mixed-motive” environmental
statutes. The Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act includes provisions
sought by the fishing industry to manage fisheries. 245 The Lacey Act
amendments protect U.S. timber companies from underpriced imports. 246
The Omnibus Public Land Act includes new historical parks and water
supply projects. 247
Third, the three statutes sweep narrowly compared with canonical
environmental statutes.
Although they are significant, fisheries
management, illegally logged timber, and new public lands designations


240

Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991 (2009).
See Environmental News Serv., Congress Votes “Yes” to Sweeping Public Lands
Protection Act, ENS NEWSWIRE, Mar. 25, 2009.
242
See Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
Magnuson-Stevens
Reauthorization
Act
(Aug.
2008),
http://www.noaa.gov/factsheets/new%20version/magstevens.pdf.
243
See, e.g., Implementation of Revised Lacey Act Provisions, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,874 (Feb.
28, 2011).
244
See 123 Stat. at 993-95 (identifying the agency associated with each set of new
authorizations).
245
See Allison A. Freeman, Attention Turns to House as Magnuson Breezes Through
Senate, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, June 20, 2006 (quoting a statement approving elements
of the legislation by a representative of the National Fisheries Institute, a fishing industry
group).
246
See Dan Berman, Illegal Timber, Omnibus Parks Bills Lead House Suspension
Calendar, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 3, 2007.
247
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 7001-7003, 9101-9115, 123 Stat. at 1183-89, 12981321.
241
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do not match the breadth of the canonical environmental statutes, which
regulate large swaths of the American economy.
Not only was Congress able to enact these statutes during a period
of overall political stagnation on environmental issues, it was able to do so
on a bipartisan basis with wide margins. The reauthorization of
Magnuson-Stevens was bipartisan compromise legislation, endorsed by
both conservation groups and the fishing industry 248 and passed in both
the House and Senate by voice vote. 249 The Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act and Omnibus Public Land Act passed by wide bipartisan
margins in both the House and Senate. 250
It is reasonable to conclude that the non-canonical character of
these three statutes contributed to their political viability. The absence of
EPA from the debate, the relatively confined scope of the legislation, and
the multiple objectives of the legislation all enabled negotiation and
compromise that eventually resulted in passage of the statutes. The
absence of EPA, a political lightning rod, dampened opposition to the bills
by reducing the political temperature of the debate. Perhaps most
important, the multiple objectives of the three statutes increased support
for the bills by broadening beyond environmentalists the range of interests
who perceived a benefit over the status quo. Fishing interests joined
conservationists in supporting the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act,
because it contained changes perceived as beneficial over the existing
statute.
The American Forest and Paper Association joined
environmentalists in supporting the Lacey Act amendments because it
protected domestic timber suppliers from competition from illegally
harvested imports. Tribes joined environmentalists in supporting the
Omnibus Public Land Act because it included water development projects
beneficial to them.
This is not to say that passage of the statutes was uncontroversial
or nonpolitical.
The Magnuson Stevens Act required extensive
negotiations among different camps of legislators and competing versions
of legislation, prodded along at key points by Senator Ted Stevens, who
was seeking a coda to his Senate career. 251 The Lacey Act amendments
248
See Freeman, supra note 245 (noting that the legislation passed the Senate by
unanimous consent and that “[g]roups representing the fishing industry and environment
and ocean advocates applauded the legislation”).
249
See Thomas, Bill Summary & Status, 109th Congress (2005-2006), H.R. 5946, Major
Congressional Actions, available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
250
See Thomas, Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), H.R. 146, Major
Congressional Actions, available at http://thomas.loc.gov (noting the Omnibus Public
Land Act passed the Senate by a 77-20 vote and the House by a 285-140 vote); H.R.
2419
(110th):
Food,
Conservation,
and
Energy
Act
of
2008,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr2419#overview (noting the legislation
passed the House by a 318-106 vote and the Senate by a 79-14 vote, followed by similar
votes to override President Bush’s veto).
251
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 245; Allison Freeman Winter, Stevens Attempts to
Revive Magnuson with New Proposal, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 7, 2006; Allison
Freeman Winter, Last-Gasp Attempts at Magnuson Dead in Water—Rep. Gilchrest,
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were revised in committee to reduce compliance burdens, and languished
in committee before finally being inserted into the broader Farm Bill.252
The Omnibus Public Land Act triggered substantial opposition from
Republicans. 253
But, unlike recent attempts to enact canonical
environmental legislation, these three statutes were able to overcome the
political obstacles in their paths and to gain passage, even by wide
margins. In short, they succeeded where proposals for canonical
environmental legislation have failed.
Three anecdotal examples cannot prove a general conclusion, but
they do provide some evidence supporting the idea that non-canonical
environmental laws can remain politically viable during periods of strong
partisan conflict over environmental issues when attempts to enact new
canonical environmental laws may be thwarted. The history of embedded
environmental legislation provides further support for this proposition.
Unlike canonical environmental law, which has tended to be enacted
during a specific period from 1970 to 1990, Congress enacted embedded
environmental laws before, 254 during, 255 and after 256 the heyday of
canonical environmental legislation.
2.

Integration

Environmental law’s shortcomings can be measured by the
mismatch that exists between environmental problems and environmental
law. In part because of the political stagnation on environmental issues,
existing environmental laws do not adequately address environmental
problems. The Clean Water Act, for example, largely exempts nonpoint
source discharges, even though such pollution is a major cause of impaired
water quality. 257 Meanwhile, science continues to identify new potential

ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Dec. 6, 2006; Lauren Morello & Allison A. Freeman,
Magnuson-Stevens Still in Play as Activists Plan for Dem Congress, ENV’T & ENERGY
DAILY, Nov. 10, 2006.
252
See Berman, supra note 246.
253
See Patrick O’Connor, House GOP Derails Public Lands Bill, POLITICO, Mar. 11,
2009; R.J. Smith, Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 on House Floor
Today—170 Bills in One; Half Have Had No Hearings, AMY RIDENOUR’S NATIONAL
CENTER BLOG, Mar. 11, 2009.
254
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 303); Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, 1068 (1920) (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)).
255
See Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1221-1223, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3823) (Swampbuster).
256
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1501, 119 Stat. 594, 1067-76 (2005)
(amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545).
257
See Jonathan Cannon, A Bargain for Clean Water, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 608, 616
(2008) (“Unregulated nonpoint source pollution is solely responsible for failure of 30 to
50 percent of U.S. waterbodies to meet water quality standards and is a contributing
factor in an even larger percentage.”).
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hazards, such as chemical toxicity at low exposure levels previously
assumed safe. 258
Not all the mismatch between environmental problems and
environmental law arises from a lack of law; the law itself contributes to
some environmental problems. Numerous laws incentivize conduct that
causes environmental harm. For example, tax breaks for the oil and gas
industry subsidize fossil fuel production and therefore consumption and its
259
associated air pollutant emissions.
Laws such as these that unintentionally yet significantly affect the
environment are generally excluded from what we consider environmental
law, because they do not deliberately address environmental concerns. 260
Yet if the project of environmental law at its most fundamental level is to
think critically and comprehensively about the relationship between law
and the environment, then unintentional environmental laws should be
integral to environmental law. Excluding laws that have inadvertent
environmental impacts creates a problematic divide between
environmental problems and environmental law. Indeed, addressing
unintentional environmental laws may well be among the most efficacious
endeavors the field can undertake.
As environmental law has matured, awareness has grown that the
goal of environmental protection is highly implicated elsewhere other than
within the domain addressed by existing canonical environmental law.
Proposals for environmental reforms seem increasingly aimed to address
environmental concerns as they arise outside of environmental law, such
as in land use, 261 energy262 and food production. 263 Underlying these
258

Jody A. Roberts, Collision Course? Science, Law, and Regulation in the Emerging
Science of Low Dose Toxicity, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2009); see also Daniel A. Farber,
Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994)
(noting that “[t]he expansion of scientific knowledge has revealed new environmental
problems”).
259
See John A. Bogdanski, Reflections on the Environmental Impacts of Federal Tax
Subsidies for Oil, Gas, and Timber Production, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323, 325-28
(2011); Roberta Mann, Waiting to Exhale?: Global Warming and Tax Policy, 51 AM. U.
L. REV. 1135, 1164-68 (2002); Temi Kolarova, Comment, Oil and Taxes: Refocusing the
Tax Policy Question in the Aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 351,
357-66 (2012); see generally Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of Environmental
Excise Taxes, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 133 (1994) (noting other examples of tax provisions
with unintentionally adverse environmental consequences).
260
See supra note 23 (defining environmental law as laws that deliberately address
human impacts on the environment).
261
See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land
Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2008); John R. Nolon,
Comparative Land Use Law: Patterns of Sustainability, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 855
(2006).
262
See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment
Disconnect, supra note 30; Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of
Energy Law and Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2011).
263
See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & the Environment: Informational and
Structural Changes for A Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (2011);
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proposals is the premise that environmental concerns should suffuse the
law generally to the same extent that environmental impacts do; wherever
there are environmental problems, there should be environmental law. 264
Canonical environmental law does not, however, offer an attractive
or viable model for integrating environmental concerns into the law.
Treating canonical environmental law as the sole model for an expansion
of environmental law would erect a substantial barrier to entry into the
field that is unlikely to be overcome except in rare circumstances.
Canonical environmental laws are big. The environmental law canon
regulates rather intensively, in terms of the burdens it places both on
regulated parties who must comply with its requirements and on
regulatory agencies that must administer and enforce the requirements.
This intensity and the burdens it entails may be entirely appropriate for the
environmental problems that the environmental law canon addresses—the
environmental law canon has tended to focus on the most pressing
environmental problems, which potentially call for comparatively
intensive regulatory responses—but intense regulation is not necessarily
appropriate for all environmental problems. Limiting the options of
environmental law to large, intense regulatory programs limits
environmental law’s viable domain.

Neil D. Hamilton, The Role of Law in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture: Reflections on
Ten Years of Experience in the United States, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 423 (1998); Michael
R. Taylor, The Emerging Merger of Agricultural and Environmental Policy: Building A
New Vision for the Future of American Agriculture, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 169, 170 (2001);
see also Laurie Ristino & Sam Kalen, Is Environmental Law Serving Society, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVT., Spr. 2012, at 52, 52 (“The environmental law of the future must
incorporate energy, food, transportation, land use, and water, just to name a few. And it
must do so unconstrained by our existing, arguably simplistic, federalist, regional, and
local models”).
264
Many of these proposals to expand the reach of environmental concerns in the law
invoke the principle of sustainability as a conceptual foundation. See, e.g., Robert L.
Glicksman, Sustainable Federal Land Management: Protecting Ecological Integrity and
Preserving Environmental Principal, 44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 151 (2008); Neil D.
Hamilton, The Role of Law in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture: Reflections on Ten
Years of Experience in the United States, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 423 (1998); John R.
Nolon, Comparative Land Use Law: Patterns of Sustainability, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
855 (2006). The ambiguity of the related terms sustainability and sustainable
development have led some scholars, however, to doubt their usefulness as conceptual
anchors. See Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward A
New Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 64 (2000) (“The problem with the
sustainable development concept is that it is subject to a variety of interpretations.”);
Glicksman, supra, at 148 (“The various formulations of sustainability have been
criticized as, among other things, vague, slippery, oxymoronic, a ‘mask[er] [of] failed
consensus,’ and a reflection of political correctness.”) (footnotes omitted); J.B. Ruhl, Law
for Sustainable Development: Work Continues on the Rubik's Cube, 44 TULSA L. REV. 1,
1-2 (2008) (noting that the concept of sustainable development is in part “window
dressing,” “a way of masking over problems,” “a way of demanding more than is
possible,” and “a way of promising more than is possible,” “which goes a long way
toward explaining why it has become so powerful a policy concept”).
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Moreover, integrating environmental concerns into new areas of
law that currently unintentionally yet significantly affect the environment
will require a better integration of environmental concerns with other
policy objectives. 265 The environmental law canon, by design, focuses
overwhelmingly on environmental concerns. Although statutes within the
canon usually mandate some balance between environmental protection
and other non-environmental goals, the intent and effect of such balancing
is merely to moderate the stringency of environmental protection so as to
mitigate other adverse non-environmental regulatory impacts, not to
affirmatively pursue other goals. For example, Clean Air Act § 202
directs EPA to establish emissions standards for new motor vehicles
“which reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable” while
“giving appropriate consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors.” 266
The inclusion of cost, energy, and safety as factors for EPA to consider
may lead EPA to moderate the stringency of the emission reduction it
requires pursuant to § 202, but in doing so § 202 is merely mitigating its
impacts on these factors, not affirmatively promoting them—§ 202
considers safety, but it is not a safety regulation. 267 Unintentional
environmental laws, however, do pursue and promote other, nonenvironmental objectives. As a result, adding environmental concerns into
unintentional environmental laws will require integrating environmental
and non-environmental goals in a way that the environmental law canon
has not attempted.
Embedded environmental law may offer a better model than
canonical environmental law for pursuing environmental protection in the
frontier areas outside of the traditional domain of environmental law.
Whereas canonical environmental law gives environmental protection
primacy and is segregated from other, nonenvironmental law, embedded
environmental law integrates substantively and institutionally with
nonenvironmental law. 268 The environmental policies that result from
265

Cf. John C. Dernbach, Achieving Sustainable Development: The Centrality and
Multiple Facets of Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 247
(2003) (arguing that integrated decisionmaking—decisionmaking that integrates
environmental and other objectives—is the foundation of sustainable development).
266
Clean Air Act § 202(a)(3)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i).
267
Canonical environmental statutes do, however, sometimes contain individual
provisions that pursue objectives entirely independent of the statute’s overall
environmental protection goal. Clean Water Act § 513, 33 U.S.C. § 1372, for example,
requires paying laborers and mechanics constructing treatment works using federal grants
under the Clean Water Act be paid prevailing wages. It is a labor law, administered by
the Labor Department, but otherwise embedded in an environmental statute.
268
NEPA, by requiring federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impacts of their
proposed actions even when those actions are taken pursuant to non-environmental
statutes, does some of the work of integrating environmental concerns into nonenvironmental law. But NEPA’s requirements are purely procedural not substantive—it
requires agencies only to consider the environmental effects of their proposed actions, not
to give any weight to environmental concerns. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). This significantly limits NEPA’s efficacy and makes
the statute an imperfect substitute for substantive environmental requirements. Cf. The
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such an integration will no doubt depart from the dominant model of the
environmental law canon, but that can be a positive development.
Delegating environmental authority to non-environmental agencies, for
example, could serve as an important step toward inculcating
environmental values in agencies that have not tended to view
environmental protection as an important objective within their programs.
For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has
relied on statutory authority in the form of embedded environmental
provisions to require new public housing to comply with energy efficiency
standards. 269
3.

Climate Change

The massive and “super wicked” 270 problem of anthropogenic
climate change looms over all other environmental issues. Despite the
legislative paralysis on the issue, 271 EPA is moving forward with
addressing climate change under its existing statutory authorities,
primarily the Clean Air Act. 272 But no one believes that current laws,
even if they are better than nothing, offer the best policy mechanisms for
addressing climate change.
The dominant proposals to date have involved some type of
statutory program that would regulate greenhouse gas emissions in a form
resembling the statutes of the environmental law canon, such as a cap-andNational Environmental Policy Act 40th Anniversary Symposium, 40 ENVTL. L. REP.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,183, 11,195 (2010) (transcribing an unidentified audience member’s
comment that “NEPA is procedural, it is in many instances window-dressing”).
269
See 42 U.S.C. § 12709 (requiring Secretary to establish standards); id.
§ 12745(a)(1)(F) (requiring compliance with standards); see also General Accountability
Office, GAO-09-46, Green Affordable Housing (2008) (concluding that HUD had taken
“positive steps” to promote energy efficiency but could do more within its existing
authority).
270
See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159-60 (2009) (explaining
that climate change is a “super wicked problem” because of its “enormous
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders,” because “the
longer it takes to address the problem, the harder it will be to do so,” because “”those
who are in the best position to address the problem . . . [have] the least immediate
incentive to act,” and because of “the absence of an existing institutional framework of
government with the ability to develop, implement, and maintain the laws necessary to
address a problem of climate change's tremendous spatial and temporal scope”); see also
Kelly Levin et al., Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism,
and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change 5-7 (June 3, 2010), available
at
http://environment.yale.edu/uploads/publications/2007levinbernsteincashoreauldWickedProblems.pdf (originating the term “super wicked” and applying it to the problem of
climate change).
271
See generally Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Climate Bill
Effort, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2010; Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, New Yorker, Oct.
11, 2010; Elizabeth Kolbert, Uncomfortable Climate, NEW YORKER, Nov. 22, 2010.
272
See
EPA,
Climate
Change:
Regulatory
Initiatives,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html.
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trade emissions program administered by EPA. 273 Such a program has not
been viable politically at the national level.
Moreover, some academics, policy analysts, and environmental
advocates have questioned whether a global system of conventional
pollution regulation is the best model for addressing climate change.
Some of these critics argue that conventional environmental regulation is
ill-suited to the unprecedented challenges that climate change poses, and
instead favor a strategy of quickly moving the economy toward the use of
low-carbon energy sources through direct public investment in
technological innovation. 274 Others are less critical of conventional
regulation, but advocate for sector-specific policies as an alternative to a
system that universally regulates greenhouse gas emissions. 275
Alternative approaches of these types—direct investment or sectorspecific regulation—could take the form of embedded environmental
laws. Such programs could be designed to take advantage of the best
features of embedded environmental laws: dispersed, relatively small
programs that reduce the political stakes and facilitate experimentation
and context-specific policy solutions.
First, relatively small climate change programs dispersed
throughout government would have potentially greater political viability
than a universal emissions system of regulation administered by EPA.
Much of the private sector already regards EPA as heavy handed and
draconian in its orientation and is likely to regard EPA regulation with
particular suspicion and with a proclivity and history of organizing
political opposition to the agency’s initiatives. The private sector is more
likely to be open to initiatives from other agencies. Many other agencies,
especially sector-specific agencies such as the Department of Agriculture,
Department of Transportation, and Department of Energy, administer a
wide variety of programs, both regulatory and non-regulatory, many of
which proactively assist the sector. Like other embedded environmental
273

See Resources for the Future, Summary of Notable Market-Based Climate Change
Bills
Introduced
in
the
111th
Congress
(May
12,
2010),
http://www.rff.org/Documents/Features/111th%20_Legislation_Table_Graph.pdf.
274
See, e.g., HOWARD LATIN, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FAILURES:
WHY
CONVENTIONAL MITIGATION APPROACHES CANNOT SUCCEED (2012); MCKINSEY & CO.,
PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY 32-34, 59-129 (2009); TED NORDHAUS &
MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, THE EMERGING CLIMATE CONSENSUS: GLOBAL WARMING
POLICY IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD (2009), available at http://
www.thebreakthrough.org/blog/PDF/EmergingClimateConsensus.pdf;.
275
See, e.g., PEW CTR. FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS
FROM THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR 3 (2008) (arguing that “sector-specific measures to
promote energy efficiency and low carbon technologies may be needed to ensure
significant GHG reductions from transportation”); Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez,
Toward an International Aviation Emissions Agreement, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. Rev. 351,
385 (2012) (arguing in favor of an international greenhouse gas emissions reduction
agreement specific to the aviation sector); Jake Schmidt et al., Sector-Based Approach to
the Post-2012 Climate Change Policy Architecture, 8 CLIMATE POLICY 494 (2008)
(arguing the advantages of a sector-based approach).
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laws, climate policies could be integrated into broader programs that
pursue a variety of objectives.
Second, dispersed climate change programs could facilitate
experimentation and context-specific policy solutions better than a
centralized system of universal emissions regulation. Such a strategy
could involve broad policy principles coordinated across government, but
implemented through sector-specific policies administered by sectorspecific agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, Department of
Transportation, and Department of Energy.
In the absence of
comprehensive policy, specific climate policies could be used to
experiment with various strategies that could be utilized to implement
future comprehensive regulation. For example, agricultural policies that
nudge farms toward less carbon-intensive energy consumption could
mitigate the impacts of an eventual comprehensive cap-and-trade or
carbon tax that would significantly raise the cost of carbon-intensive fuels.
Regardless whether dispersed sector-specific climate policies
would supplement or substitute for a system of universal climate
emissions regulations, dispersed climate policies in the form of embedded
environmental laws could by virtue of their distinct functional features
provide significant benefits beyond what a universal uniform regulatory
system could attain.
III.

Understanding Environmental Law

In addition to offering a model for environmental lawmaking that
provides a potentially important alternative to the environmental law
canon, noncanonical environmental laws can generate important
conceptual insights. In particular, noncanonical environmental laws, by
virtue of their location at the periphery of the field of environmental law,
can offer illumination into some of environmental law’s existential issues.
A.

Expanding the Recognized Domain

Including noncanonical environmental laws in the study of
environmental law expands the recognized domain of environmental law
beyond the canon that currently predominates in the field. Bringing
environmental laws from outside of the canon into the study of
environmental law broadens the scope of laws associated with the field
overall. This more expansive view of environmental law reveals the
field’s topography to be more varied than it appears from conventional
viewpoints that focus solely on the canon. Embedded environmental laws,
for example, evidence that environmental law has been produced in forms
and at times quite different than the canon of major regulatory programs
that arose during the Environmental Revolution of the 1970s. 276
276

See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying text (noting that embedded environmental
laws have been enacted during times in which canonical environmental lawmaking has
not been active).
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Expanding the scope of recognized environmental law beyond the canon
thus reveals the form of the canon—including the problems it addresses,
the institutions it has created, and the regulatory mechanisms it employs—
to be a contingent product of a particular historical moment. The
environmental law canon is not merely the result of Americans embracing
environmental values, but rather also involved a series of choices
regarding how to embody environmental values in the law. Embedded
environmental laws thus can remind us of the underappreciated diversity
of ways in which law can pursue environmental protection. To borrow
John Witt’s observations in a different context, conventional accounts of
the development of environmental law often “tacitly assume a determinate
relation between a particular course of social change . . . and a particular
regime or doctrinal structure” in environmental law. 277 Embedded
environmental laws counteract a tendency to assume the inevitability or
essentiality of the environmental law canon.
B.

Central and Peripheral Cases

At a deeper conceptual level, noncanonical environmental laws can
provide material for the exploration of some of the central questions about
the field to an extent that environmental laws within the canon cannot do
by themselves. To see how, we can analogize the distinction between the
environmental law canon and noncanonical environmental laws to the
distinction in legal philosophy drawn between a central case and a
peripheral or limit case.
Scholars of legal philosophy exploring the concept of law have
differentiated between law in its central case, which lies at the heart of the
category of law, and law in its peripheral or limit case. 278 Here, a central
case is an instance of something within a category that exhibits all the
features properly associated with the category; a peripheral case does not
have all of these features, but enough of them to fall within the
category. 279 Although there is disagreement about the extent to which
productive analytical inquiry should focus on central cases versus
peripheral cases, there seems to be some agreement that considering both
types of case in combination facilitates the appreciation of the overall
277

See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 9 (2004) (stating his thesis that
“both of the conventional historical accounts [of the development of modern American
accident law] tacitly assume a determinate relation between a particular course of social
change (industrialization) or a new intellectual development (changing ideas about
causation) and a particular regime or doctrinal structure in accident law”).
278
See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS 9-11 (2d ed. 2011); John
Gardner, Nearly Natural Law, 52 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (2007). Finnis traces the central case
concept to Aristotle’s focal meaning and Max Weber’s ideal-type. Finnis, supra, at 9.
279
JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 150 (1999) (contrasting “typical cases”
in which the signature traits of a category “are manifested to a very high degree” and
“borderline cases” “in which all or some [traits] are present only to a lesser degree”). See
Gardner, supra note 278, at 21 n.25 (“There are various limit cases in which one or the
other of these features is lacking, while others remain.”).
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category to its fullest. Thus, John Finnis contends that one can move from
an examination of the central case to an examination of peripheral cases
that “trace[s] the network of similarities and differences, the analogies and
disanalogies, . . . between them and the central cases.” 280 And John
Gardner notes that neglecting either the central case or peripheral cases
leads to analyses that “provide[] only a partial account of their subject.” 281
For the field of environmental law, the canon represents a type of
central case, and noncanonical environmental law a peripheral case. 282
Like the central case, the canonical environmental statutes exhibit all the
features associated with environmental law—national pollution statutes
enacted primarily for the purpose of protecting the environment and
administered by EPA—with the notable exception of NEPA and the
Endangered Species Act. 283 Noncanonical environmental laws, on the
other hand, have enough features associated with the field that they are
recognized as environmental law—most notably, a goal of environmental
protection—but do not exhibit many of the features otherwise associated
with the field. 284
Despite its location at the periphery of the field, however—indeed,
because of its location at the periphery of the field—noncanonical
environmental law is crucial to understanding environmental law overall,
including canonical environmental law. For example, noncanonical
environmental laws raise, in a much more acute way than the statutes in
the environmental law canon, the question of what is environmental and
what is not.
C.

Blurring the Boundaries

The field of environmental law is generally defined to encompass
laws with a goal of environmental protection or limiting ecological
impacts. 285 But precisely what objectives fall within this category is
280

Finnis, supra note 278, at 11.
Gardner, supra note 278, at 32.
282
Scholars who have used the central-versus-peripheral case framework have tended to
attach a direct normative superiority to the central case. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note
278, at 5 (describing the central case as “the case that shows how the other cases . . .
ought to be”). But one can move from the normative, wherein the central case represents
what the category ought to be, to the descriptive, wherein, for example, the central case
represents what the category is generally thought to be. Of course, even identifying
certain characteristics of a law as salient makes an indirectly evaluative judgment, insofar
as it indicates that those characteristics are important to a normative evaluation of the
law. See JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND NORMATIVE THEORY 51-67 (2001).
283
See supra Part I.B.2.
284
See supra Part II.B.
285
See supra note 23; see also, e.g., CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF
THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (2d ed. 2007) (“Environmental Law is law designed to protect the
environment, and the plants and animals that rely on it, including us.”); LAZARUS, supra
note 9, at 1 (“[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in order to limit ecological
impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity.”); Michael C. Blumm, Studying
Environmental Law: A Brief Overview and Readings for a Seminar, 12 J. ENERGY NAT.
281
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unclear. Traditional notions of what constitutes nature or the environment
have been criticized as based on naïve visions “of a pristine nature that
exists apart from people.” 286
Statutes within the environmental law canon tend not to clarify the
issue, because their goals of protecting environmental public health and
ecological concerns reside at the core of environmental law. The
environmental-ness of these statutes is so obvious that we need not—and
generally do not—explain how they are environmental. With respect to
many environmental laws outside the canon, however, the environmentalness is not so straightforward or clear:
 Energy Efficiency. Congress originally enacted fuel economy
standards for vehicles as part of the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975 to reduce demand for oil during the Oil
Shock of the 1970s. 287 Subsequent amendments to the statute—
like energy policy generally—have to some extent incorporated
environmental protection. 288
 Safety Statutes.
Statutes such as the Hazardous Materials
289
and the Pipeline Safety Act 290 regulate to
Transportation Act
protect against accidents that threaten public safety. Accidents
involving hazardous materials or pipelines clearly have adverse
environmental effects, but the statutory purposes refer only to
protection of “life and property.” 291
 Food Safety. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA) 292 includes provisions that regulate food safety. 293 One
such provision, enacted as part of the Food Quality Protection

RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 309, 310 (1992) (“Environmental law is a loose amalgam of
common law and (increasingly) statutory provisions designed to protect public health,
ecosystems, and dependent animal and plant species.”).
286
Keith Kloor, Environmentalists Are Battling Over the Nature of Nature, SLATE, Dec.
12, 2012; see also William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the
Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69
(William Cronon, ed., 1996).
287
See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA), § 2, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89
Stat. 871, 874 (1975).
288
See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), 121 Stat. 1492 (2007).
The EISA, although still focused on energy independence and security, includes among
its aims references to concerns that are clearly environmental—for example, “clean
renewable fuels” and “greenhouse gas capture and storage.” 121 Stat. at 1492.
289
49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5128.
290
49 U.S.C. §§ 60101-60140.
291
See 49 U.S.C. § 5101 (“The purpose of this chapter is to protect against the risks to
life, property, and the environment that are inherent in the transportation of hazardous
material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.”); 49 U.S.C. § 60102(a) (“The
purpose of this chapter is to provide adequate protection against risks to life and property
posed by pipeline transportation and pipeline facilities by improving the regulatory and
enforcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation.”).
292
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399d.
293
21 U.S.C. §§ 341-350l-1.
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Act’s 294 amendments to the FFDCA, directs EPA to establish
tolerances for pesticide residues in food. 295 Pesticide tolerances
are directed at the same public health goal as other food
regulations in the FFDCA, such as prohibitions against false or
misleading labeling on foods. 296 Pesticide use does, however, have
significant environmental implications, which are regulated under
other statutes. 297
Invasive species. Invasive species can have devastating ecological
consequences. 298 The Plant Protection Act, which aims to prevent
the spread of invasive plant pests and weeds, mentions
environmental protection as a goal, 299 but focuses primarily on
impacts on agriculture.
Conservation. Some conservation, such as the national parks
system, 300 seems obviously to fall within the ambit of
environmental protection. Other statutes, however, contemplate
conservation for the purpose of maintaining supplies of a natural
resource for future commercial exploitation.301 Still other laws fall
somewhere in between. 302 Whether laws that pursue conservation

Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
21 U.S.C. § 346a(b).
296
21 U.S.C. § 343.
297
See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y.
298
See, e.g., Thoms H. Fritts & Dawn Leasman-Tanner, The Brown Treesnake on Guam:
How the Arrival of One Invasive Species Damaged the Ecology, Commerce, Electrical
Systems, and Human Health on Guam: A Comprehensive Information Source (U.S.
Geological Survey, 2001), available at
http://www.fort.usgs.gov/resources/education/bts/bts_home.asp (noting the proliferation
of non-native brown tree snakes on Guam has wiped out much of the island’s population
of birds and small mammals); H.R. 6311, The Nonnative Wildlife Invasion Prevention
Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans of the H.
Comm. on Natural Resources, 110 Cong. 31 (2008) (statement of Marc Gaden, Ph.D.,
Legislative Liaison, Great Lakes Fishery Commission) (noting the sea lamprey “laid
waste to the [Great Lakes] fishery after it invaded the Upper Great Lakes in the 1920s”).
299
7 U.S.C. § 701(1) (finding that “the detection, control, eradication, suppression,
prevention, or retardation of the spread of plant pests or noxious weeds is necessary for
the protection of the agriculture, environment, and economy of the United States”).
300
For example, the National Park Service Organic Act directs the Park Service to
manage national parks, monuments, and reservations “to conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of
the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.” National Park Service Organic Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 1.
301
A 1955 statute, for example, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to assist the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in controlling and draining water from anthracite mine
formations to “conserve natural resources,” because “the presence of large volumes of
water in anthracite coal formations involves serious wastage of the fuel resources of the
Nation.” 30 U.S.C. § 571.
302
For example, the Department of Agriculture’s soil conservation programs tie the
abatement of soil erosion to a variety of concerns, some environmental and some not,
although the program focuses overall on maintaining agricultural productivity. 16 U.S.C.
590a (“[I]t is declared to be the policy of Congress to provide permanently for the control
295

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OUTSIDE THE CANON

61

are environmental laws may depend on what resource is being
conserved and for what purpose.
As these examples illustrate, considering noncanonical
environmental laws both clarifies and muddies efforts to define what it
means for a law to be an environmental law. On the one hand, focusing
on the limit cases of the field (noncanonical environmental laws) can lead
us to posit what seems to be a plausible conceptual delineation of the
field’s boundary: environmental laws intentionally regulate human causes
of ecological disruption. On the other hand, the fact that many
noncanonical environmental laws also seem to lie as well within other
recognized fields—such as transportation or agriculture—strongly
indicates that environmental law, especially at its periphery, overlaps
considerably with related fields. Environmental law, from this viewpoint,
does not so much as end as it does fade into other, overlapping fields.
D.

Practical Implications

The question of what is environmental has considerable practical
as well as theoretical import. What is categorized as environmental—as
opposed to agricultural, for example—matters because the classification of
an issue as environmental affects the institutions that are called upon to
address it (e.g., which congressional committee, which agency), the
interest groups that mobilize to support or oppose it, the regulatory model
assumed for creating law to address the issue, and even the theoretical
approaches to analyzing the issue.
The Swampbuster provision offers an example. Although the
provision was enacted to conserve wetlands—a type of environmental
protection—Congress enacted the Swampbuster as part of the Food
Security Act, 303 a farm bill that went through the House Agriculture
Committee 304 and Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
Committee 305; was delegated to the Department of Agriculture for
implementation; and took the form of a condition on farm subsidies rather
than a direct restriction. The same objective of wetlands conservation
could be pursued—and has been pursued 306—in the form of
environmental legislation that would go through the House Resources
Committee and Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
delegated to an environmental agency for implementation, and in the form
of a direct restriction on the use of wetlands.
and prevention of soil erosion to preserve soil, water, and related resources, promote soil
and water quality, control floods, prevent impairment of reservoirs, and maintain the
navigability of rivers and harbors, protect public health, public lands and relieve
unemployment . . . .”).
303
Pub. L. No. 98-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
304
See H.R. Rep. No. 99-271(I), at 78, 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1103, 1180.
305
See S. Rep. No. 99-145, 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676, 1969-70.
306
See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (establishing a permit program for
discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States—a program that
regulates the filling of wetlands).
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Occupational exposure to toxic substances provides another
example. The Occupational Safety and Health Act 307 treats occupational
exposure to toxic substances as an employment law issue, enacted by
legislation that goes through the congressional labor committees, governed
by a statute implemented by the Department of Labor. The Toxic
Substances Control Act, 308 however, treats the same problem as an
environmental law issue, enacted by legislation that goes through the
congressional environmental committees and is implemented by EPA.
Recognizing that the boundaries of environmental law are blurry
not sharp, and that many situations arising within environmental law—
especially those outside of the canon—also arise within other fields,
broadens the array of potential regulatory options for responding to
environmental problems. Policy advocates and lawmakers decide—
usually implicitly—about whether to frame an issue as environmental or
as something else. Making that decision deliberately could create
opportunities for laws that are more reflective of messy realities and better
tailored to our complex needs.
Indeed, full appreciation of the overlap between environmental
issues and other areas of law might induce exploration of how new legal
structures can develop to reflect these blurry boundaries and overlapping
legal fields. Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, for example, have examined
how agencies can beneficially exercise coordinated concurrent regulatory
jurisdiction—what they call “shared regulatory space.” 309 Freeman and
Rossi’s discussion of shared regulatory space, including the tools agencies
can use to coordinate their overlapping regulatory jurisdictions and
methods of assessing and improving coordination, is illuminating and
instructive. They do not, however, discuss the ways in which overlapping
boundaries of substantive legal fields—for example, environmental law
and safety law—create an impetus for shared regulatory space, or how the
design of shared regulatory space should reflect overlapping legal
fields. 310 More work is needed to develop legal structures and institutions
with, for example, capability to address issues that implicate multiple
fields, objectives, and perspectives.
IV.

Conclusion

The history of environmental law over the last four decades in the
United States provides cause for both optimism and pessimism about the
field’s future. The existing major environmental statutes that comprise the
canon of environmental law have accomplished significant improvements
in environmental quality while proving resilient in the face of sometimes
harrowing political headwinds. On the flip side, however, the canon has
307

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2695d.
309
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 189.
310
Cf. Aagaard, supra note 196, at 281-85 (arguing that issues perceived to arise within
multiple legal fields will and should tend to lead to overlapping regulatory jurisdictions).
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calcified over time, proving resistant to reform and difficult to employ
against emerging environmental threats.
If it is to succeed in protecting human health and the environment,
the environmental law of this new century may need to evolve into
something that looks quite different than the extant environmental law
canon. The next generation of environmental laws must be viable for
creation and implementation even in an antagonistic political climate;
amenable to integration with other, non-environmental law; and able to
make inroads against the monumental peril of global climate change.
Environmental laws embedded in larger non-environmental programs
offer an alternative model to the environmental law canon—an alternative
model that seems well suited to a new generation of environmental law.
The major federal pollution statutes that comprise the
environmental law canon will continue to form the centerpiece of
American environmental law for the foreseeable future. But other
environmental laws outside of the canon, and especially embedded
environmental laws, have the potential to play a much greater role in
environmental policy going forward. Such embedded environmental laws
exhibit features quite different from the canonical environmental statutes:
whereas major environmental statutes are large regulatory programs
administered by EPA and focused on environmental protection, embedded
environmental laws are dispersed, relatively small programs that often
integrate environmental protection with other objectives. These features
create important functional differences between the environmental law
canon and embedded environmental laws, differences that in some
circumstances give embedded environmental laws advantages over
canonical environmental laws. The small size and narrow scope of
embedded environmental laws, for example, facilitate experimentation and
context-specific policy solutions. Embedded environmental laws can sow
the seeds of future broader changes in the law and can enlist the
participation of new institutional actors with fresh perspectives and
additional resources.
Studying embedded and other noncanonical environmental laws
also broadens and deepens our understanding of environmental law as a
legal field. Noncanonical environmental laws are environmental laws but
usually not only environmental laws—they also are labor laws, agriculture
laws, or transportation laws as well. Environmental law should reflect this
complicated and messy reality. Attempting to maintain a set of
environmental laws segregated substantively and institutionally from other
fields unduly constrains the project of environmental law, which in its
essence should seek to suffuse environmental concerns into the law
generally.
Environmental effects are everywhere in the law, so
environmental concerns should be spread throughout the law as well.

